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REVISITING THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE PROCEDURE FOR THE REVISION OF
JUDGMENTS
Juliette McIntyre*

I. Introduction
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is a court of first and last in1
2
stance. Its decisions are “final and without appeal.” At first blush, this
seems uncontroversial; it is a simple restatement of the well-established
3
principle of res judicata. But if the court makes a judicial pronouncement
without all the facts to hand, can one say that the decision is legitimate and
4
authoritative? Pursuant to article 61 of the ICJ’s Statute, the court does
5
have the authority to revise a judgment in certain, limited circumstances.
Revision is a remedy that enables the court, upon the application of a party,
6
to reconsider an otherwise final and binding decision. An application for
revision is admissible when a new fact is discovered that was unknown to
the parties and the court during the proceedings, and which would have the
7
effect of overturning or altering the court’s judgment.

*
BA LLB/LP Hons (Flin) LLM International Law (Cantab) PhDc (Melb). This work
is derived from my PhD research, so I must give thanks to my supervisors Professor Hilary
Charlesworth and Professor Margaret Young for their support.
1.
Robert Jennings & Rosalyn Higgins, General Introduction, in THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 7 (Andreas Zimmermann, Karin
Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat, Christian Tams, Maral Kashgar & David Diehl eds., 2d
ed. 2012). It is “a forum of first and last resort.” Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
601, 603 (Gerald Askin ed., 2005).
2.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 60, Oct. 24, 1945, U.N.T.S. 993
[hereinafter Statute ICJ]; see also Joan E. Donoghue, The Role of the World Court Today, 47
GA. L. REV. 181, 193 (2012); Jens Evensen, The International Court of Justice Main Characteristics and Its Contribution to the Development of the Modern Law of Nations, 57 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 3, 12 (1988).
3.
See Derek W. Bowett, Res Judicata and the Limits of Rectification of Decisions by
International Tribunals, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 577 (1996); Andreas Kulick, Article 60
ICJ Statute, Interpretation Proceedings, and the Competing Concepts of Res Judicata, 28
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 73 (2015).
4.
As noted by Caron, “the legitimacy and authority of the Court ultimately rest on the
quality of its judgments” in David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections
on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 26 (2000).
5.
Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 61; Rules of Court, 6 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 90, art. 99.
6.
Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 60; Donoghue, supra note 2, at 192; Evensen, supra
note 2, at 3.
7.
The precise terms of art. 61 are discussed infra Part II.
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Revision is described by Robin Geiß as “a rather neglected form of pro8
9
ceedings.” While the rule has domestic law analogues, and has existed in
10
its essentials since 1899, it was not until 1984 that the court first received
11
an application for revision of a judgment in the case of Tunisia v. Libya.
Since then, there have been five applications for revision, of which three
12
have proceeded to a judgment on the question of admissibility. To date,
the court has not revised any of its judgments.
By way of example, the court is regularly called upon to delimit contested boundaries between states. The competing territorial claims may be
justified, among other things, on the basis of geography, history, effectivités,
13
or the doctrine of uti possidetis. The court will base its decision on the evi14
dence presented in support of these justifications, which will bar the sub15
sequent litigation of any part of the judgement. Indeed, this was precisely
the situation in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in which a Chamber of the
8.
Robin Geiß, Revision Proceedings before the International Court of Justice, 63
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 167, 167 (2003).
9.
While space prevents me from going into detail, see 28 U.S.C. § 399 (2020); Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) § 39.05, (Austl.); FED. R. CIV. P. 59; Code Civ. Procedure § 115
(India); Civ. Procedure Code § 115 (Bangl.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] §§ 593–
603 (Fr.). The German civil code provides for “revision” but functionally operates as appeal
insofar as the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof to accept a motion for revision depends upon
systemic factors such as whether the case raises a legal question of fundamental importance or
a need to promote the development of the law. The decision then annuls the original judgment
of the lower court and replaces it. See also Daniel Mitidiero, The Ideal Court of Last Resort: A
Court of Interpretation and Precedent, 5 INT’L J. PROC. L. 201, 213 (2015); Pablo BravoHurtado, Two Ways to Uniformity: Recourse to the Supreme Court in the Civil Law and the
Common Law World, in NOBODY’S PERFECT – COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON APPEALS AND
OTHER MEANS OF RECOURSE AGAINST JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CIVIL MATTERS 319 (A.
Uzelac & C.H. van Rhee eds. 2014).
10.
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 55, July 29,
1899, 1 Bevans 230.
11.
See Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment, Continental Shelf
(Tunis./Libya), Application, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 (July 27).
12.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment on Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶ 192 (Dec. 10); Application for Revision of
Judgment of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Feb. 3); Application for Revision of Judgment
of Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep.
392, ¶¶ 401–402 (Sept. 11); Application for Revision of Judgment of Sovereignty over Pedra
Branca/Pulau Batu Pueh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2017
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 2) (case was discontinued following a negotiated settlement); Application
of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb. 26); see also infra Part III.A.3.
13.
Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE L.J., 1779, 1781–92 (2004).
14.
See Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Evidence before the International Court of Justice, 1
INT’L L.F. DROIT INT’L, 202 (1999).
15.
See Bowett, supra note 3, at 577; Kulick, supra note 3, at 73.
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Court delimited part of the frontier line between the two states and settled
16
the legal situation in respect of certain islands in the Gulf of Fonseca. But,
nine years and 364 days after the judgment was delivered, El Salvador
claimed that it had new evidence to prove the boundary had been incorrectly
fixed and requested that the court revise its earlier decision, essentially a request to redraw the boundary delimited a decade previously.
While in this particular instance the court held that the new evidence,
including a new copy of the 1794 map Carta Esférica did not require the
17
court to overturn its original decision, there is the potential for a request to
redraw a settled boundary to undermine international peace and security as
18
tensions reignite over claims to territory. In particular, if the court makes a
judicial pronouncement without all the facts on hand, this may reflect poorly
on the substantive justice meted out by the court. A decision based on in19
complete information may not be complied with, and may in turn under20
mine the court’s already fragile legitimacy.
21
This article considers the court’s procedural approach to revision. To
begin, Part II will describe the historical development of the revision rule,
16.
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J.
Rep. 351 ¶¶ 599–600 (Sept. 11). A five-member Chamber of the Court had been constituted
under art. 26(2) of the Statute and art. 17 of the Rules of Court, at the parties’ request. A new
Chamber was constituted to hear the revision proceedings.
17.
Application for Revision of Judgment on the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶¶ 410–411 (Dec. 18).
18.
See generally KAIYAN HOMI KAIKOBAD, INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DECISIONS (2012).
19.
See Thomas Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System,
240 RECUEIL DES COURS 22, 303 (1993).
20.
Filippo Fontanelli & Paolo Busco, The Function of Procedural Justice in International Adjudication, L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS., 1, 21 (2016); Caron, supra note 4, at 26
(noting, “the legitimacy and authority of the Court ultimately rest on the quality of its judgments.”); see also LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (Nienke Grossman, Harlan
Grant Cohen, Andreas Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2018); INTERNATIONAL COURT
AUTHORITY (Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Masden eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2018); Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Madsen, International Court Authority (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 112, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096930; Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107, 112 (2009) (defining a legitimate international
court as “one whose authority is perceived as justified.”).
21.
The individual elements required under article 61 of the Court’s Statute to permit
revision have been studied in depth by others, e.g., the problem of accurately defining the
‘facts’ that must be considered. JUAN JOSÉ QUINTANA, LITIGATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 1025–56 (2015); see also WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND
REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS
425 (1971) [hereinafter REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION]; WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN,
THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1997); SHABTAI
ROSENNE, INTERPRETATION, REVISION AND OTHER RECOURSE FROM INTERNATIONAL
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (2017); Robin Geiß & Andreas Zimmermann, Article 61, in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1651 (Andreas
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inspired by Viñuales’ call to make connections between the past and the
22
present in matters of institutional design. The drafting history of revision
explains why the procedure takes the form that it does, as well as its ambitions and its limitations. In particular, Part II identifies that revision has often conceptually been conflated with annulment. But these remedies are
quite different in scope and purpose, and the distinction has impacts on the
court’s practice today. Part III then proceeds to identify and critically analyze procedural problems that have arisen, or which have the potential to
arise, in light of the court’s jurisprudence. This Part will show that revision
is a procedure that has remained essentially unchanged from its nineteenth
century iteration, giving rise to a series of procedural problems. In particular, the court’s practice of treating a revision application as a new case and
permitting the revision of incidental proceedings gives rise to potentially illogical outcomes, such as a binding decision on the merits that was issued
ultra vires. Part IV offers some proposals to rectify the current flaws in the
court’s approach to revising its judgements. Here it is suggested that the
court may, by making small adjustments to its revision procedure, continue
to rely on the revision procedure as an instrument of substantive justice
without the risks associated with its current approach. Part V concludes.

II. The History of Revision: From Finality to Justice
The revision procedure has domestic law antecedents. While Del Vecchi claims that “no juridical institution is to be regarded as a prototype of
23
others,” the generally accepted view is that analogies taken from national
law were, and remain, “a key factor in determining the nature of an interna24
tional court of justice, and in filling in its constituent statute.” Indeed,
Judge Shahabuddeen has observed that “[t]he history of the creation of the
Permanent Court makes it clear that the concept of a court of justice to
which the Court was intended to conform was that of a court of justice as
25
generally understood in municipal law.” This Part begins with domestic

Zimmermann, Christian J. Tams, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christiam Tomuschat eds., 3d ed.
2019); KAIKOBAD, supra note 18.
22.
Jorge E. Viñuales, Experiments in International Adjudication Past and Present, in
EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS 29 (Ignacio de la
Rasilla & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019).
23.
Giorgio Del Vecchio, Universal Comparative Law, in 3 EVOLUTION OF LAW:
SELECT READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS:
FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 63 (A. Kocourek & J.H. Wigmore eds.,
1918).
24.
Ole Spiermann, Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 Advisory
Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 73 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 259 (2002).
25.
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Order, 1990 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, 18 (Feb. 28) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting). But see Mathilde Cohen, The Continuing
Impact of French Legal Culture on the International Court of Justice, in COMPARATIVE
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law antecedents and analogies of judicial revision, moving to address early
international law scholarship, emphasizing the drafting history of article 61
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. A close reading of the
drafting history reveals the limits of revision as a procedural function. In
particular, a distinction can and must be drawn between the judicial purposes of appeal, nullification, and revision. This will in turn inform the discussion of the court’s present current practice in Part III.
The current procedure for the revision of judgments is articulated in article 61 of the court’s Statute. It states:
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only
when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party
claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not
due to negligence.
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of
the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact,
recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open
to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this
ground.
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of
the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six
months of the discovery of the new fact.
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten
26
years from the date of the judgment.
This procedure is supplemented by articles 99 and 100 of the Rules of
Court. These require that a request for the revision of a judgment is made by
an application and state that the court will rule on the question of the admis27
sibility of that application before proceeding to the act of revision. Upon
the discovery of a previously unknown fact, a party can make an application
for revision, and the revision proceedings have to be (by convention) entered in the General List as formally distinct proceedings from the initial
28
case. However, the court must be convinced of the need to revise its judgment; it is not a procedure accessible to the parties by right. Not only must
INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 198 (Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hughes Verdier &
Mila Versteeg eds., 2018) (the “[f]ramers of the ICJ and its predecessor courts were not so
much looking toward national high courts as their inspiration, but rather toward international
arbitral tribunals”).
26.
Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 61.
27.
Rules of Court, 6 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 90, arts. 99, 100.
28.
For a description of this process, see Juan J. Quintana, Procedures Before the ICJ:
A Note on the Opening (or Not) of New Cases, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L TRIBS. 115, 117 (2010).
For more on the General List, see SHABTAI ROSENNE, The General List of the International
Court of Justice, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 197, 197–98 (2007).
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“new” facts have come to light, but those facts must also be “decisive.” The
facts must be of such a nature that knowledge of their existence would have
29
“changed the decision of the Court.”

A. Domestic Analogies
To make a decision that is not subject to further scrutiny is an “attribute
30
of ultimate ‘sovereignty.’” As the decision-making function of the sovereign was delegated to subordinate persons and institutions, there would inevitably arise decisions that the sovereign did not agree with, and desired to
31
change, amend, or revise. The letters of Hammurabi show that he “investigated the suits of his poorest subjects, and did not hesitate to reverse the de32
cisions of his governors.” Procedures for the reconsideration of judgments
are evident in major domestic legal systems and international law. Both
common and civil law jurisdictions have long known forms of appeal. Although there are exceptions, French procedure provides for review of judg33
ments in first instance by way of appel. Since 1790, the French judiciary
has adopted a two-level appellate structure. The Cours d’appel hear appeals
34
as of right, an invention of the civil law. Above the Cours d’appel sits the
Cour de cassation, a body to which a pourvoi en cassation can be brought
to quash the decisions of lower courts for errors of law. The matter is then
usually remitted to the lower court for a decision on the merits in light of the
35
ruling on the law. Similarly, the German model provides for “revision” but

29.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of Continental Shelf Judgment (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, 246 (Dec. 10) (Schwebel, J., writing separately).
30.
Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 629, 635 (1980).
31.
Lord Justice Atkin, Appeal in English Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 1 (1927); see also
Peter F.W. Burns, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Constitutional Bulwark or
Colonial Remnant, 5 OTAGO L. REV. 503, 504 (1984) (noting that “[a]ppellate jurisdiction had
its genesis in the theory that the King was the source and dispenser of justice throughout his
dominions and was therefore the authority to be resorted to in any case of grievance by error,
delay or obstruction in the ordinary courts.”).
32.
Stanley A. Cook, Ancient Semitic Procedure, in 2 EVOLUTION OF LAW: SELECT
READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 659 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds. 1915).
33.
Nina Nichols Pugh, The Structure and Role of Courts of Appeal in Civil Law Systems, 35 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1164–65 (1975). The French appeal procedure “permits a thorough overhaul of the case, extending to a retaking of old, as well as the taking of new, testimony and the exploration of issues of law that were not raised in the first instance
proceedings.” ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 104 (2d ed. 1977).
34.
John T. Hood Jr., The Right of Appeal, 29 LA. L. REV. 498, 498 (1969).
35.
VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 104; JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES
WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 47 (2006). Since 1979, the Cour de cassation has
had the power of cassation sans renvoi; that is, to “enter a definitive judgment” where quashing the decision of the lower court “does not require further inquiry into the facts of the case.”
However, this does not fundamentally alter the fact that the Cour de cassation is a court of
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functionally operates as appeal insofar as the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof to accept a motion for revision depends upon systemic factors such as whether the case raises a legal question of fundamental importance or a need to promote the development of the law. The decision
36
then annuls the original judgment of the lower court and replaces it.
The history of the common law courts of appeal is significantly different. Appeal as of right was unknown; rather, appeal on questions of law (not
37
fact) could be instigated by the issuance of a prerogative writ. Other do38
mestic legal systems have developed similar appellate procedures.
39
Appeal serves both an immediate “error correction” function, and also
40
41
one of ensuring “the proper interpretation of the Law” in future cases. Or
review but does not re-decide cases submitted to it. JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON, & SIMON
WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 3, 47, 48, 107 (1998).
36.
See Mitidiero, supra note 9, at 213; see also Bravo-Hurtado, supra note 9, at 319.
37.
At the King’s courts there were three writs available:
[A] writ of prohibition which prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction which
does not belong to it and stops proceedings in it altogether, the writ of mandamus
which compels a court to proceed and do justice according to the law, and, lastly, a
very important writ, the writ of Certiorari, which brought up decisions at the law
courts for review before the King’s court to be quashed for excessive jurisdiction or
for error if it was placed on record that there was an obvious mistake in law.
Atkin, supra note 31, at 1, 2, 5. There was also a “writ of error” available in the common law
courts. The writ was regarded as “an entirely new proceeding” and not as a continuation of the
case under consideration, as in the civil system. Hood, supra note 34, at 499. This situation
pertained until the United Kingdom’s Judicature Act of 1873 established the Court of Appeal.
From the Court of Appeal lay further appeal to the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) under the United Kingdom’s Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876. In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Supreme Court and adopted “a procedure similar to the common
law writ of error,” until the creation of the federal courts of appeal by the Evarts Act of 1891.
See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; Hood, supra
note 34, at 512.
38.
While it is not the place of this study to undertake a comprehensive review of appellate procedures in domestic legal systems, it is worth noting that appellate procedures were
also well established in the Russian legal system. See generally GORDON B. SMITH,
REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1996); Marianna Muravyeva, Russian Early
Modern Criminal Procedure and Culture of Appeal, 38 REV. CENT. E. EUR. L. 295 (2013);
Jane Henderson, Improvements in Russian Courts: Citizens’ Appeals and Judges, 2 EUR. PUB.
L. 508 (1996). For examples from countries in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan, see Do
Myoun-Hoi, Discontinuity And Continuity In The Traditional Korean Judicial System During
Its Modern Reform Period, 1894 to 1905, 17 ACTA KOREANA 307 (2014); Tsukasa Mihira,
Institutional Change and Judicial Review in Contemporary Japan, in THE CHANGING ROLE
OF LAW IN JAPAN - EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN CULTURE, SOCIETY AND POLICY MAKING 173,
179 (Dimitri Vanoverbeke, Jeroen Maesschalck, David Nelken & Stepham Parmentier eds.,
2014).
39.
Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 60 (2010) (stating that the
concern is not the governance of the system as a whole but rather the whether the “right” or
“wrong” law was applied in the dispute.).
40.
Mitidiero, supra note 9, at 210; see also Mateus Aimoré Carreteiro, Appellate Arbitral Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 185, 190 n.31 (2016)
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as expressed by Irene Ten Cate, “appellate review fulfils two principal func42
tions: error correction and lawmaking.” The remedy of revision is distinct
from appeals in civil and common law systems at least in part because it is
“carried out by the same [international] tribunal which made the original
43
decision.” Derek Bowett correctly has emphasized that:
[R]evision is in no sense an appeal. It involves no hierarchy of
courts, with the object of allowing a second, and different, court to
reverse the findings of the first court. Revision allows a reference
back to the same court on the very limited ground that the discovery of new facts might justify the court in revising its own deci44
sion.
45

As such, the revision procedure provides for a “formal exception” to the
46
principle of res judicata. This principle of finality is closely related to the
47
effectiveness of the resolution of disputes. The remedy of revision is dis-

(stating that the Brazilian civil system distinguishes between “ordinary” appellate courts having an error correction function and superior courts which serve the purpose of law harmonization).
41.
In some instances, such as with a court of cassation, the only purpose of an appeal
is to ensure the proper application of law; the application of that law to the facts is reserved
for the court below. See BELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 3; VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra
note 33, at 104.
42.
Irene Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1110 (2012). However, according to some legal scholars,
appeal can be conceived as a form of patronage (benevolent intervention from a supreme authority), as a form of distributive politics (the adoption of efficient rules through market forces), and as a form of political integration (promoting unity). Shapiro, supra note 30, at 635.
There is also the incentive of “error avoidance,” whereby judges of lower courts will be, Cate
argues, more diligent when they know they are subject to review. Cate at 1143, 1147–48.
However, the dominant view in the literature is that the primary goal of appeal lies in this dual
function of error correction and law harmonization.
43.
Derek W. Bowett, Res Judicata and the Limits of Rectification of Decisions by International Tribunals, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 577, 577 (1996).
44.
Id. at 591.
45.
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425; see also Geiß & Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 1654 (noting that, “revision adversely affects the principle of judicata”); CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 161 (2007)
(suggesting that revision “does some violence to the principle of res judicata”).
46.
Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Res Judicata and the Test of Finality, 5 J. TERRITORIAL
& MAR. STUDS. 75 (2018); Kulick, supra note 3, at 75; Iain Scobbie, Res Judicata, Precedent
and the International Court: A Preliminary Sketch, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 299, 303 (1999);
Bowett, supra note 43, at 577; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 336–56 (1987).
47.
Dinah Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts, 9
CHINESE J. INT’L L., 537, 558 (2009); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 245 (2012); see also Charter
of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36 ¶ 3 , June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (stating that “legal disputes should as a
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tinct from appeal, at least in part, because it is “carried out by the same tri48
bunal which made the original decision” but also because no res judicata
49
will arise until the final appeal is heard.
Thus, revision cannot be conceived as serving an error correction or
50
lawmaking function. Instead, the purpose of revision is to return to the
original judgment and ensure it reflects the facts that the court ought to have
known at the time when it renders the judgement. It is a protection against
51
the miscarriage of justice, where, for reasons of ignorance or through de52
liberate fraud, the evidence presented to the court was misleading.
The distinct function of revision from that of appeal is also evident in
53
54
revision’s historical roots in equity. The federal courts in Canada, Aus55
tralia, and the United States each incorporate a procedure for the amend56
ment of judgments after they have been handed down. Revision is also
57
commonly used in civil law systems. While there are slight variations in
each jurisdiction, in all cases, revision requires the application of a party.
This is contrary to situations where a court has an inherent jurisdiction to
58
correct a slip or error, or declare void and set aside a judgment so irregular
59
as to amount to a nullity.
general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice”); Nuclear Tests
Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974, I.C.J. Rep. 457 ¶ 476 (Dec. 20).
48.
Bowett, supra note 43, at 577.
49.
CHENG, supra note 46, at 372.
50.
Contra REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 217–18 (taking the
view that appeal, review, revision, interpretation, and rectification are relatively indistinguishable, save for the fact that appeal and review take place before a new tribunal and their respective “emotive differences”).
51.
Bowett, supra note 43, at 591. For this reason, revision is a remedy available in
respect of both civil and criminal judgments; see also Hakan Friman, International Criminal
Procedures: Trial and Appeal Procedures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 271, 281–83 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); Anne-Marie La Rosa,
Revision Procedure under the ICC Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 1559 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2015).
52.
Catherine A. Kunz, Revision of Arbitral Awards in Switzerland: An Extraordinary
Tool or Simply a Popular Chimera?, 3 ASA BULL. 6, 6 (2020) (stating “[Revision] is only
available in exceptional circumstances where justice and equity command.”); cf Nathalie Voser & Anya George, Revision of Arbitral Awards 43 (Post Award Issues: ASA Special Ser. No.
38, 2011).
53.
Rosemary Krimbel, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure
for Judicial Policymaking, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 919, 930 (1989).
54.
Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 ¶ 399(2) (Can.).
55.
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05 (Austl.).
56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); see also Civ. Procedure Code, Act No. 5 of 1908, § 115 (India); Civ. Procedure Code, Act No. V of 1908, § 115 (Bangl.).
57.
See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 593–603 (Fr.).
58.
Lawrie v Lees (1881) 7 App Cas 19, 34-5 (Austl.); see also Civ. Procedure Code,
Act No. 5 of 1908, § 152 (India); Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(e) (Austl.); FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(c); The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, c. 40 §12 (UK); Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106 ¶ 397(2) (Can.). In respect of correcting a slip or error at the ICJ, see Geiß &
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However, the grounds for revision of a judgment vary from country to
country. In France, the Code de procédure civile provides for the revision of
a judgment in cases where witness or documentary evidence is later found
60
to be false. Canadian federal courts will set aside or amend an order on the
basis of “a matter that arose or was discovered subsequent to the making of
61
the order.” The United States formulation closely resembles the ICJ Statute: “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
62
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial,” with express provi63
sion for a “rehearing.” The roots of revision in domestic law highlight the
importance of revision as a means of doing substantial justice to the par64
ties. They also illustrate critical points about revision procedure: first, revision is a remedy, demanding the reopening of a case and a variation of the
judgment; second, it is a distinct procedure from the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to declare void and set aside a judgment so irregular as to amount to
a nullity; and third, it differs from appeal insofar as the appeal is a process,
not a remedy, demanding no particular outcome. By contrast, revision “has
65
as its raison d’être in the discovery of some new fact” that would have led
the court to a different conclusion.

B. Early International Arbitration
One can see different approaches in early international arbitration.
66
Agreements to arbitrate “differences of an important character” between
pre-Westphalian sovereigns at times included mechanisms for appeal or correction of the decisions. For example, an arbitration treaty between the
Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Nevers reserved to the arbitrator, King
Philip III of France, a power to “correct and to interpret” the award, which

Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1651; Application for Revision and Interpretation of the
Judgment of Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985, I.C.J. Rep. 192, 198 (Dec.
10).
59.
Craig v. Kanssen [1943] KB 256 (Eng.); Chief Kofi Forfie, Odikro of Marban v.
Barima Kwabena Seifah, Kenyasehene, 2 J. Afr. L. 46, 47 (P.C. Appeal, 1958) (Ghana); see
also CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 112–121 (Fr.); Taylor v Taylor (1979) 25
ALR 418, 424 (Austl.) (stating the court has the inherent power to set aside an order made
against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their case).
60.
CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 595 (Fr.) (“reconnues ou judiciairement
déclarées fausses depuis le jugement.”).
61.
Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 ¶ 399(2)(a) (Can.).
62.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2).
63.
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2019).
64.
See Condon (Trustee) Re Rayhill (Bankrupt) v Truthful Endeavour Pty Ltd (2015)
323 ALR 83, 105 (Austl.).
65.
Bowett, supra note 43, at 589.
66.
See Henry S. Fraser, Sketch of the History of International Arbitration, 11
CORNELL L. REV. 179, 193 (1926).
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67

was exercised in 1285. Additionally, Pierre Dubois of Normandy’s 1306
plans for the creation of an arbitral court consisted of a bench of six judges
68
from whom there would be one appeal to the Pope.
During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, however, the use of arbi69
tration in international relations declined, and therefore there is little evidence of state practice concerning the revision of judgments. Yet, doctrinal
70
debates continued regarding the role of arbitration. Many of these debates
centred on the question of whether the decision should be subject to appeal
or reconsideration. Michael Reisman posits that, over the centuries, writers
have fallen into one of two camps: “Finalists,” who maintained that finality
of a judgment or award must be “inviolable;” and “revisionists,” who argued that “in order to flourish,” international arbitration must provide a sys71
tem of review. Into the former camp, Reisman places the classical authors
72
73
Pufendorf, Vattel, and Grotius, who wrote:
[T]he Civil Law may direct and does in some places direct that it
shall be lawful to appeal from them and to complain of their wrong;
this cannot have a place between kings and peoples. For, in their
case, there is no superior power, which can either bar or break the
tie of the promise. And therefore they must stand by the decision
74
whether it be just or unjust.
Likewise, Vattel argued that “if the injustice is of small consequence, it
75
should be borne or the sake of peace.” However, a closer reading of Vattel
reveals that he also acknowledged the possibility of an ultra vires arbitral
76
decision to which a party would not need to submit. He put forward that a

67.
Tobias Theinel & Andreas Zimmermann, Article 60, in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 1623.
68.
Fraser, supra note 66, at 179–80.
69.
See id. at 198 (describing this decline as “an eclipse”).
70.
HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 1123 (Richard Tuck ed. 2005);
see also Fraser, supra note 66, at 182.
71.
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 21.
72.
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE MODO LITIGANDI IN LIBERATE NATURALI [ON THE
WAY OF DECIDING CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIBERTY OF NATURE] (W. Evans Darby trans.,
1899). Although Pufendorf acknowledged that States could agree to such a mechanism: W.
EVANS DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES
3rd
WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED, AND OF INSTANCES SINCE 1815 60 (4 ed, Peace Society,
1900).
73.
See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
JUSTICE (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund, Inc.
2008) (1758).
74.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 350–51 (William Whewell trans., Cambridge 1st ed. 1853), cited in Reisman, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 22.
75.
DE VATTEL, supra note 73, at 451.
76.
Id. at 451.
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sentence “evidently unjust and unreasonable” would “deserve no atten77
tion.”
78
With the ratification of the 1794 Jay Treaty, the use of international
79
arbitration witnessed a considerable increase. By 1890, the Interparliamen80
tary Union “agreed upon the arbitration as the sine qua non of any treaty.”
But the nineteenth-century international arbitration agreements rarely con81
tained a procedure for revision of the award. One example is from 1898,
wherein article 13 of the Arbitration Treaty between Italy and the Argentine
Republic – one of only two general arbitration treaties in existence at the
time – stated that:
The decision cannot be appealed from, and its execution is entrusted to
the honor of the nations signatory to this agreement. However, a demand for
revision will be allowed before the same tribunal which rendered the award
and before it is executed:
(1) If it has been based upon a false or erroneous document;
(2) If the decision was in whole or in part the result of an error of
positive or negative fact which results from the acts or docu82
ments in the case.
Another instance arose in an unratified 1897 Anglo-American treaty,
which included permission for “a rehearing under certain determined condi83
tions.” In an 1899 treaty, Argentina and Uruguay agreed to permit revision
where the award was based on a document that had been falsified or tam84
pered with.

77.
Id. at 451.
78.
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116; see also CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 17
(Oxford University Press 2007); Charles H. Brower II, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial Settlement under Private and Public International Law, 18 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L L. 259, 269 (2008).
79.
Fraser, supra note 66, at 202–03.
80.
ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE: ‘THE PARLIAMENT
OF MAN, THE FEDERATION OF THE WORLD’ 366 (Kluwer Law International 1999).
81.
In two arbitrations involving the United States, there was an attempt of revision of
the award. Both instances were unsuccessful, and neither is discussed here because the parties
had not agreed upon a procedure for revision in the compromis. See KAIKOBAD, supra note
18, at 236.
82.
General Treaty of Arbitration, It.-Arg., art. 13, July 23, 1898, 11 U.N.T.S 1776–
1949; see also JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS, THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 200–
02 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter
HAGUE 1899].
83.
Id. at 624.
84.
ARBITRATION TREATIES AMONG THE AMERICAN NATIONS TO THE CLOSE OF THE
YEAR 1910, at 262 (William R. Manning, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 1924) (cited in
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 235).
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There were also contemporaneous, overlapping discussions regarding
the possibility of annulling an arbitral award. For example, in 1867, Johann
Caspar Bluntschli proposed that an award was invalid if the tribunal ex85
ceeded its powers or if there was dishonesty on the part of the arbitrators.
In 1875, the Institut de droit international drafted a Projet de règlement
pour la procedure arbitrale internationale in the hope that it would be used
by states as a starting point for drafting their arbitration agreements. Article
27 of the Projet set out, “[t]he arbitration award is null in the event of a null
compromis, or abuse of power, or proven corruption of one of the arbitrators
86
or of essential error.” Signor Pasquale Fiore, in 1897, suggested “an arbi87
tral sentence may be disputed. . . and may be annulled” where the arbitrators had gone beyond the limits of the compromis, or where it was “founded
88
upon error, or obtained by fraud.”
In light of these limited examples, it is not surprising that Édouard
Descamps noted in his seminal Essai sur l’organisation l’arbitrage interna89
tional in 1896 that appeal was not the currently accepted practice. But he
also sought to grapple with the 1875 Projet and suggested that one of the
benefits of a standing international court would be the ability to review the
90
judgments of other tribunals for excès de pouvoir. Descamps observed that
“the power of appeal exists in almost all civilized states and by analogy the
91
majority of the Commission has accepted it,” and as such, parties could
legitimately provide for appeal procedures in their compromis. But the 1895
Brussels Conference of the Interparliamentary Union, during which the first

85.
Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Arbitration Proceedings, in INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS: A COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED,
AND OF INSTANCES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 188, 190 (W. Evans Darby ed., Wentworth
Press, 4th ed. 1904).
86.
“[l]a sentence arbitrale est nulle en cas de compromis nul, ou d’excès de pouvoir ou
de corruption prouvée d’un des arbitres ou d’erreur essentielle.” INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L,
PROJET DE RÈGLEMENT POUR LA PROCEDURE ARBITRALE INTERNATIONALE art. 27 (1875),
https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1875_haye_01_fr.pdf (Author’s translation above
the line). An earlier draft by Dr. Levin Goldsmith, which would have provided recours for any
one of eleven grounds of nullity, was rejected by the Institut. See REISMAN, NULLITY AND
REVISION, supra note 21, at 31–34; Chester Brown, Supervision, Control, and Appellate Jurisdiction: The Experience of the International Court, 32 ICSID REV. 595, 597 (2017);
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 234.
87.
Signor P. Fiore, The Arbitration Tribunal, in INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A
COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED, AND OF
INSTANCES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, supra note 85, at 546, 570.
88.
Id. For further examples and discussion thereof, see KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at
234; see also REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 29–31.
89.
EDOUARD DESCAMPS, ESSAI SUR L’ORGANISATION DE L’ARBITRAGE
INTERNATIONAL MEMOIRE AUX PUISSANCES 30 (E. Guyot 1896).
90.
Id. at 34–35.
91.
“[l]a faculté d’appel existe dans presque tous les États civilises et par analogie la
majorité de la Commission l’a admise.” Id. at 62–63 (Author’s translation.).
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92

parameters of an international court were agreed upon, considered that an
93
award should be final and without review.

C. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899
This short historical overview shows that at the close of the nineteenth
century the notions of nullity and revision were somewhat overlapping, and
94
the conceptual distinctions required refinement. This began to emerge at
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, where the debate between finalists and
revisionists arose again in a contestation between the American delegate
Frederick Holls and his Russian counterpart Feodor Martens. Revision was
95
in fact “the most vexed issue” in 1899. It is worth considering their debates in more detail especially because the ICJ’s current revision procedure
96
is functionally identical to the one agreed upon in 1899.
One of the key ambitions of the Third Commission of the 1899 Confer97
ence was to establish a “uniform practice” with respect to the mechanisms
of peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Having received several
98
motions on the subject of a permanent international court of arbitration, a
Comité d’Examen was convened to discuss the establishment of such a court
99
and an arbitral procedure “accepted by all.” The Comité opened its ninth
100
meeting with the Russian Draft of Arbitral Code, which provided that any
101
arbitral award would be “without appeal.” This proposal was objected to
by the American delegation during the tenth meeting, with a request that
this would be replaced with a provision that “every litigant shall have a right
102
to a second hearing.” A vote on the matter was postponed in light of the
103
deadlock.
Martens argued that, should revision or appeal become an accepted procedure, “we shall tear down with one hand what we construct with the other

92.
EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 366.
93.
DESCAMPS, supra note 89, at 63.
94.
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 234.
95.
Arthur Eyffinger, A Highly Critical Moment: Role and Record of the 1907 Hague
Peace Conference, 54 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 221 (2007).
96.
SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERPRETATION, REVISION AND OTHER RECOURSE FROM
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 9 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007).
97.
Peace Conference at the Hague 1899: Russian Circular January 11, 1899,
AVALON PROJ. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hag99-02.asp, (last visited Mar. 10,
2021).
98.
This included motions from the Russian, British, and American delegations.
EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 584.
99.
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 583.
100.
Id. at 180–83.
101.
Id. at 180.
102.
Id. at 733.
103.
Id. at 751.
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By contrast, the

Every litigant which shall have submitted a case to the international
tribunal shall have the right to a reexamination of its case before the
same judges, within three months after the notification of the decision, if it declare itself able to invoke new evidence or questions of
105
law not raised or settled the first time.
For the Americans, the matter was one of principle rather than form.
Frederick W. Holls declared that he would “accept any text whatever,” pro106
vided there was some procedure for reconsideration of a case. The German delegate Philipp Zorn, attempting to surmount the impasse, pointed out
that the American proposal “had nothing in common with appeal,” insofar
as the proposal did not move the case from one judge to another, but rather
107
“the same judges would complete, so to speak, their former information.”
Unanimity was never achieved in the Comité—neither on the principle
108
of revision nor on the form revision should take. The resulting article 55
109
in the final text of Convention [No I] was a compromise, and an unsatis110
factory one at that. Drafted by TMC Asser in consultation with Holls, and
then further amended by the President of the Comité, Léon Bourgeois, the
final formulation was replete with ambiguity. It read:
The parties can reserve in the compromis the right to demand the
revision of the award.
In this case, and unless there be an agreement to the contrary, the
demand must be addressed to the tribunal which pronounced the
award. It can only be made on the ground of the discovery of some
new fact which is of a nature to exercise a decisive influence upon

104.
Id. at 742.
105.
The original American plan for a permanent international court had included a provision that “[e]very litigant before the International Tribunal shall have the right to make an
appeal for re-examination of a case within three months after notification of the decision, upon presentation of evidence that the judgment contains a substantial error of fact or law.” U.S.
STATE DEP’T OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, Instructions to the International (Peace) Conference at
the Hague 1899, in 2 PAPER RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
WITH THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS 511 (Dec. 3,
1907), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/ch97subch12; see also
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 189.
106.
HAUGE 1899, supra note 82, at 749.
107.
Id. at 749.
108.
Id. at 752–55.
109.
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 55, July 29,
1899, 1 Bevans 230.
110.
Contra ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 10 (taking the view that it was “well conceived
and well laid, and [has] stood the tests of time.”).
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the award and which, at the time the discussion was closed, was
unknown to the tribunal and to the party demanding the revision.
Proceedings for revision can only be instituted by a decision of the
tribunal expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing in it the character described in the preceding paragraph, and declaring the demand admissible on this ground.
The compromis fixes the period within which the demand for revi111
sion must be made.
Jonkheer van Karnebeek of the Dutch delegation considered the pro112
posal to actually imply appeal, rather than revision. Cases of fraud were a
113
“new fact,” Holls stated, despite the British delegate, Sir Julian Pauncefote, requesting that situations of fraud be entirely excluded from rehear114
ing. These questions and inconsistencies were left unresolved, however.
Later authors, such as Reisman, suggest “the travaux of the 1899 Act
pressed the concept of new facts into an omnibus function, similar to that
115
served by excès de pouvoir.” But this claim is not entirely made out, not
least because the doctrine of excès de pouvoir does not serve such a function, rather it is a particular ground for annulling the decision of an arbitral
116
tribunal on the basis of the tribunal having exceeded its jurisdiction. Excès
117
de pouvoir was a concept very familiar to the members of the Comité, but

111.
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109, art.
55; HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 244.
112.
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 750; see also EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 405.
113.
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 753.
114.
EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 393.
115.
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425.
116.
See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Jurisprudence Comparée des tribunaux administratifs
Internationaux en matière d’excès de pouvoir, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INT’L 482
(1956); Edouard Laferrière, Origine et Développement Historique du Recours pour Excès de
Pouvoir, 5 LIBRARIE GENERALE DE DROIT ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 303 (1997); Arnold Raestad, Le Recours à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale Contre les Sentences des Tribunaux d’Arbitrage Internationaux pour Cause d’Incompétence ou d’Excès de Pouvoir,
13(ser. 3) REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 302 (1932);
Alfred Verdoss, Excès de Pouvoir du Juge Arbitral dans le Droit International Public, 9(ser.
3) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 225 (1928); see also Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J.
Rep. 106 (Nov. 12) (separate opinion by Shahabuddeen, J.); Case Concerning the Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 130 (Nov. 12)
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
117.
See Edouard Descamps, Essai sur l’organisation de l’arbitrage international memoire aux puissances, 28(ser. 1) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 5,
30 (1896).
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the drafters of article 55 instead adopted the terminology of “fait nou118
119
veau,” relying on the Italy-Argentina treaty of 1898 for guidance.
Whether or not an award could be annulled on the basis of excès de
pouvoir or any other ground was treated as a question separate from the re120
vision procedure and was left unresolved. Holls’ suggestion that the
Comité should accept the text of article 27 of the 1875 Projet was reject121
ed. Article 26 of the Russian Draft of Arbitral Code, which declared that
“[t]he arbitral award is void in case of a void compromis or exceeding of
122
powers, or of corruption proved against one of the arbitrators,” was not
123
taken further and not incorporated into Convention [No I]. The Comité
could not decide on who should judge such claims of invalidity, and so
avoided the issue altogether, in the hope that the newly created Permanent
Court of Arbitration could eventually “guide [s]tates to a solution of this
124
matter.” The important distinction between revision on the basis of fait
nouveau and annulment for excès de pouvoir are discussed in Part IV, below.

D. Revision at the PCIJ
While revision was one of the most hotly contested issues in The
Hague, it was barely mentioned during the drafting of both the Permanent
125
Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) and ICJ Statutes. As noted above,
the present article 61 is substantially identical to article 55 of Convention
126
127
[No I]. Article 55 was retained, with inconsequential amendments, at
the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Martens did attempt to have

118.
A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 152–54
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1909).
119.
See HAGUE 1899, supra note 82 at 749, 753. The Comité, however, did not adopt
the precise text of the 1898 treaty as it was considered too broad and too close to appeal.
120.
Id. at 151.
121.
Id. at 749–50.
122.
Id.
123.
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109, art.
55.
124.
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 151.
125.
The principle of revision of arbitral awards was debated during the 1912 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, but those in favor of revision won the
day. Joaquin D. Casasus & Frederic D. McKenney, Revision of Arbitral Awards, 6 PROCS.
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: ANN. MEETING (1907-1917) 59 (1912).
126.
Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109.
127.
The question of the time limit for revision was the subject of some contention, but
this discussion does not have any impact on the present study. See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, PROCÈS-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,
16 JUNE–24 JULY 1920, at 744 (The Hague, Van Langenuysen Bros. 1920); REISMAN,
NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425.
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the provision “suppressed” at the Conference, but his motion was “rejected
128
almost unanimously.” The Brazilian delegate Ruy Barbosa declared:
[T]here would be nothing more harmful to the authority of arbitration than to assure to such judgments the privilege of incontestability. We must cling to the idea that arbitration is a means of peace
129
only because it is an instrument of justice.
For the 1920 Commission of Jurists, the 1907 project “served as a point of
130
departure,” with the stipulation added that ignorance of the new fact must
“not be due to a failure on the part of the party to use due diligence in the
131
conduct of the case.” Eventually, the phrase “not due to negligence” was
132
settled on and “considered sufficient.” The time limit for bringing an application for revision was also extended to ten years overall, but within six
133
months of the discovery of the new fact. The only comment of any real
substance relating to the revision procedure at the PCIJ came in the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ final 1924 report, authored by James Brown Scott:
The right of revision is a very important right, and affects adversely
in the matter of res judicata, a point which for the sake of international peace should be considered as finally settled. Justice, however, has certain legitimate requirements; the Committee, after due
134
consideration, decided that there must be a right of revision.
Beyond this, no further debate was recorded. By contrast, a Romanian
proposal to allow for appeal against a judgment of the PCIJ where it had
failed to follow agreed procedure was dismissed as “useless and danger135
ous.” It was “inadmissible that the Court should be able to annul its own
136
137
decisions.” No more was said on this matter.

128.
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425; see also HAGUE 1899,
supra note 82, at 369–71, 437; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109.
129.
2 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE
PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS, THE CONFERENCE OF 1907, at
370 (Oxford Univ. Press 1920).
130.
Leo Gross, New Rules and Institutions for the Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes, 76 PROCS. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 131, 134 (1982) (quoting MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 83–84 (Macmillan 1943)).
131.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744; see also
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 27–33.
132.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744; see also
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 27–33.
133.
See also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 245–47 (outlining these debates concerning
the time limit for bringing an application for revision).
134.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744.
135.
Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th 1922, 1921 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No.
2, at 103.
136.
Id.
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The first rules of court were adopted by the PCIJ in its preliminary session on March 24, 1922. It was agreed that an application for the purposes
of article 61(1) was to be made “in the same form as the application men138
tioned in article 40 of the Statute;” that is, in the same form as an application instituting fresh proceedings. Moreover, for the purposes of article
61(3), the court could make a “special order rendering the admission of an
application conditional upon previous compliance with the terms of the
139
judgment impeached.” The 1922 Rules also contained a separate provision for the court (or president if the court was not sitting) to unilaterally
correct an error in a judgment arising from a “slip or accidental omis140
141
sion.” This provision was deleted in 1934 and never used.
During the drafting of the rules, the Judges Altamira and Loder, as well
as the Secretariat, amongst others, each submitted a memorandum setting
out proposals for the court’s procedure. Judge Altamira proposed that upon
receipt of an application for revision, the original case be reopened and re142
argued after the court had decided that a new fact had been discovered.
Judge Loder and the Secretariat, by contrast, proposed that proceedings in
143
revision should be treated as a new case. Shabtai Rosenne suggests this
latter approach, which was adopted by the court, aims at preserving the “fi144
nality of the original res judicata” while revision proceedings are outstanding. However, the procedural interaction between the old (impeached)
case and the new case is not addressed. Unlike in a case of interpretation,

137.
Or if it was, those thoughts have not been recorded for posterity. As noted by James
Brown Scott, there were three unofficial and unrecorded meetings dedicated to rules of procedure, on which “substantial agreement was reached,” with the results of those discussions being “silently incorporated in the finished project.” JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS: REPORT AND COMMENTARY 11 (1920); see also Ole Spiermann,
Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists and the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L 187.
138.
Rules of Court (adopted March 24, 1922), 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, art. 61.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. art. 75.
141.
Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2,
app. 3, at 603; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J.
Rep. 192, ¶ 198 (Dec. 10) (“The Court does of course have the power to correct, in one of its
judgments, any mistakes which might be described as “erreurs matérielles”. That power
would not normally be exercised by way of a judgment since the very nature of the correction
of such an error excludes any element of contentious procedure.”).
142.
Preparation of the Rules of Court, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, at 280.
143.
Id. at 250.
144.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 53; see also Karel Wellens, The International Court of
Justice, Back to the Future: Keeping the Dream Alive, 64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 193, 207
(2017); Jessica Joly Hébert, Distinguishing Interpretation and Revision Proceedings at the
International Court of Justice, 19 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 200, 222–23 (2020).
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145

where the original res judicata remains unchanged, in a case of revision,
the original res judicata is replaced, but that replacement may not extend to
146
the entirety of the original decision. If the revision is treated as a new
case, the result is intolerable double jeopardy. On the other hand, if revision
is treated—as it is in domestic courts—as a procedure for reopening and
variation, there is no confusion regarding the original judgment’s status.
This anomaly was not addressed in later iterations of the rules. Rather, a
new complication was added in 1926 with the creation of a new procedure
147
for separating preliminary objections from the merits, which can be seen
148
149
in Mavrommatis and Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.
The introduction of preliminary objections added two complications for
the revision procedure. The first complication was a short-lived provision
requiring that objections to the court’s jurisdiction to revise a judgment
should be addressed as preliminary objections in accordance with the new
150
article 38. This provision did not survive past the 1936 Rules. The second
and much more important complication, which still remains today, is
whether a separate decision on preliminary objections “constitutes a res ju151
dicata in the proper sense of that term,” and is therefore subject to revision. The issue did not confront the PCIJ, as no requests for revision were
brought any time from its inaugural sitting in 1922 until its dissolution in
152
1946. The implications for the present court are discussed in Part IV, below.

145.
Theinel & Zimmermann, supra note 67.
146.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in
the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶
247 (Dec. 10) (separate opinion by Bastid, J.); see also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 313.
147.
Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2,
add. 3, at 282.
148.
The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Jurisdiction, 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 (Aug. 30).
149.
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Preliminary Objections, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6. (Aug. 25).
150.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 55.
151.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J.
Rep. 6, ¶ 59 (July 18).
152.
The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) did very briefly discuss revision in two of its advisory opinions. In one case, the PCIJ appeared to indicate that the power
of revision is inherent. Authors disagree and international judicial practice is inconsistent regarding this question. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 55 (July 13). Bowett, considers revision not to be an inherent power. BOWETT, supra note 3, at 590. Brown takes the
opposite view. Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals,
2005 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L 195, 218; see also Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 9, ¶ 64 (Sept. 4) (“The Court
refers to what it has already said regarding the definitive character of the decision in question,
and does not feel called upon to give an opinion on the question whether such decisions can –except when an express reservation to that effect has been made - be revised in the event of
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E. Revision at the ICJ
In 1945, the San Francisco Conference received no proposals for
amendments to article 61 of the Statute, nor was there any discussion of the
153
reasons for continuing with it. This is perhaps surprising given that the
utility of a completely neglected procedure must surely have been open to
question. The revision procedure was slightly amended in the 1946 Rules,
with the addition of a paragraph stating that the court, if it admits the application for revision, “will determine the written procedure required for exam154
ining the merits of the application.” The effect of this change served only
to emphasize the two-stage procedure already demanded by article 61. Save
155
for renumbering, the rules relating to revision were untouched in 1972.
156
When the court adopted a completely new set of rules in 1978, there had
still been no application for revision, and so the court had no experience to
draw on. The 1978 Rule is merely “in the main a clearer rendering of the
157
fundamental procedural requirements of previous versions of the Rules.”
In substance, the procedure under the rules for instituting revision of a
judgment is the same as it has been since 1922.

III. Revision Proper or Revision Simulacra: Charting the
Court’s Approach
As noted above, the court has only dealt with three cases of revision
proper, applying article 61, since it was set up in 1945. Geiß observes that
158
certain kinds of territorial disputes tend to characterize revision cases, but
the existence of an essential error being proved, or of new facts being relied on. But even if
revision under such conditions were admissible, these conditions are not present in the case
before the Court.”); id. ¶ 66 (“fresh documents do not in themselves amount to fresh facts”).
This issue presented significant challenges for parties in a later ICJ proceeding, but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September
1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.),
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶ 31 (Sept. 11).
153.
See generally Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1945).
154.
International Court of Justice Registry, International Court of Justice: Amended
Rules of the Court, 11 I.L.M. 899, art. 78.
155.
Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 99; see also International Court of Justice
Registry, International Court of Justice: Amended Rules of the Court, 11 I.L.M. 899; Shabtai
Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the International Court of Justice, 8 ISR. L. REV.
197 (1973); Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1973).
156.
See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT; A
COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1983).
157.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 68.
158.
Robin Geiß, Revision Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, 63
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 167, 175
(2003); see also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 235.
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for the court, this has not been the only context in which applications for revision arise. In addition, there have been cases that might be considered revision simulacra – instances where the court has reconsidered a judgment
but without an application of article 61. Some of these cases manifest the
potential problems identified in the drafting history above. In particular,
these include the importance of the conceptual distinction between revision
and annulment; the intersection between preliminary objections and revision; and the effect of the court’s decision in 1922 to treat revision, procedurally, as a new case.

A. Revision Proper
1. Tunisia v. Libya
Tunisia v. Libya combined requests for revision, interpretation, and the
159
“correction” of an error. The original case was brought pursuant to a 1978
special agreement and concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf
160
between Libya and Tunisia. As with many delimitation cases, the 1982
161
judgment was detailed and technical. Each state had granted various petroleum concessions in the Mediterranean, and the geographical placement
of these concessions and their apparent congruence was relied on by the
162
court in the determination of the appropriate delimitation line.
In its application for revision, Tunisia submitted that there was, no
commonality in the lines of the states’ petroleum concessions. This was the
163
“new fact,” which had only been discovered upon Tunisia unearthing a
resolution of the Libyan Council of Ministers setting the boundary of Libya’s 1968 concession at twenty-four degrees east of north. Tunisia argued
the apparent convergence of the states’ petroleum concession boundaries
164
was “a decisive factor in the court’s judgment.”
The court held that, while the exact coordinates of the Libyan concession were not known to the court or to Tunisia, they were readily obtainable
by Tunisia, had proper inquiries been made, and it was in Tunisia’s own in-

159.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶
53 (Dec. 10) (sidestepping the question of whether it had jurisdiction to correct “erreurs matérielles” by finding that Tunisia’s application in this respect was “based upon a misreading of
the Judgment, and has thus become without object.” The Court held therefore there was “no
need . . . to examine the wider question of the correction of an error in a judgment.” As noted
above, the jurisdiction to correct a genuine error is common in domestic courts.).
160.
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 ¶¶ 32–34.
161.
WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER, FRAUDULENT
EVIDENCE BEFORE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE DIRTY STORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
162.
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 ¶ 203 (Dec. 10).
163.
Id. ¶ 21.
164.
Id. ¶ 16.
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terest to have obtained them. In other words, “one of the essential conditions
of admissibility of a request for revision” was lacking, as Tunisia had been
negligent in failing to ascertain the north-western boundary of the Libyan
165
petroleum concession. Moreover, “the line resulting from the grant of the
concession was . . . by no means the sole consideration taken into account
166
by the Court.” As such, it did not constitute a “decisive factor” in the original decision. The court, rather, held that “the details of the correct coordinates of Concession No. 137 would not have changed the decision of the
167
Court as to the first sector of the delimitation.”
Despite it being the first revision case in the court’s history, the judges
had little to say on the function served by the procedure. Only Judge ad hoc
Bastid was inspired to comment on the implications of a revision, noting:
The Statute of the Court, while laying down the conditions of admissibility of an application for revision, is silent as to the effects of that application if deemed admissible. What would it imply to reopen the merits of a
168
case, and to what extent should the case as a whole be reviewed?
She continued by observing that a request for revision was one of ut169
most gravity, and, as such, strictness in weighing the question of admissi170
bility was vital. Ad hoc Judge Bastid’s views signify a cautious approach,
emphasizing the importance of the consequences of a revision, while at the
171
same time due regard for “the parties” situation as sovereign States.’ Ad
hoc Judge Bastid’s reflections mirror the unanswered questions raised dur172
ing the drafting of the 1922 Rules.

2. El Salvador v. Honduras
In this case, Honduras questioned whether the new documentary evidence as to the course of the River Goascorán constituted a “new fact” or
173
was instead a new interpretation of a previously known fact. Honduras ar-

165.
Id. ¶ 28.
166.
Id. ¶ 35.
167.
Id. ¶ 39; see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, The International Court and its Freedom to Select the Ground Upon Which it Will Base its Judgment, 56 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q.
171, 175–76 (2007).
168.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 247, ¶ 2 (Dec. 10)
(separate opinion by Bastid J.).
169.
Id. ¶ 3.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
See Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th 2022, 1921 P.C.I.J. (ser. D)
No. 2, at 280; Rosenne, supra note 21, at 53
173.
There was a minor side conflict as to whether El Salvador had complied with the
concomitate time limit of six months since the date of discovery of the allegedly new fact, but
it was not taken up by the Court. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September
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gued that there is a distinction between “the facts alleged and the evidence
174
relied upon to prove them.” Rather than taking the opportunity to clarify
the meaning of “new facts,” the revision chamber elided this issue by proceeding on the basis of an assumption that the “alleged facts” were indeed
“new facts,” and focused its analysis on whether they were of such a nature
as to be decisive factors. In the chamber’s view, they were not. Rather, the
new map did “not overturn the conclusions arrived at . . . in 1992; it bears
175
them out.” The chamber also addressed the issue of whether an application for revision could be admissible based on the agreement of the parties;
the answer was a clear no. The chamber held that “regardless of the parties”
views on admissibility, it is for the court “to ascertain whether the admissi176
bility requirements laid down in Article 61 of the Statute are met.”
Again, the chamber emphasized the need to take a strict approach to the
177
admissibility requirements of article 61 but otherwise made no comment
on the general function or purpose of revision. Ad hoc Judge Paolillo, in dissent, made a number of relevant observations; in particular, “an application
178
for revision is by its very nature and object exceptional.” Furthermore,
this dissenting opinion observed that there exists:
a negative perception of the institution of revision, which is viewed
as a means of breaching the sacrosanct principle of res judicata.
According to this view, revision is a substitute for appeal and as
179
such represents a threat to legal certainty.
El Salvador v. Honduras also raised an interesting point of procedure.
180
In the original case Nicaragua had appeared as an intervener but was not
181
before the chamber during the revision proceedings. The nature of the relationship between an intervener and a revision judgment is not at all clear
from the statute, rules, or the court’s jurisprudence. Rosenne suggests that
an intervener cannot initiate revision proceedings, but can request permis-

1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.),
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶ 36 (Sept. 11).
174.
Id. ¶ 31; see also Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier),
Advisory Opinion, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 9 (Sept. 4).
175.
Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 2003 I.C.J. Rep.
392, ¶ 53.
176.
Id. ¶ 59.
177.
Id. ¶ 22 .
178.
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 413,
¶ 32 (Dec. 18) (Paolillo J., dissenting).
179.
Id. ¶ 30
180.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 62, Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
181.
Nicaragua was supplied with a copy of the revision application but did not appear
in the proceedings or make any submissions.
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182

sion to intervene, again, under article 62. For present purposes, as it has
been the court’s consistent practice to treat applications for revision as new
cases, Rosenne’s approach, at first, appears logical. But, as argued below,
treating revision as a new and separate proceeding is not procedurally neutral. It leads to potentially absurd outcomes, such as an intervener having to
reapply and re-establish its legal interest, and the court having to re-decide
this issue.

3. Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro (Genocide)
The third case of revision proper was Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, one of the most procedurally complex matters to have ever come be183
fore the court. Commenced in 1993, Yugoslavia had filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction and to the admissibility of the case. On July 11,
1996, the court dismissed those objections and proceeded to the merits
phase, accepting that it had jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to article
184
IX of the Genocide Convention. Yugoslavia submitted its countermemorial in 1997, including a number of counterclaims that were subsequently withdrawn on April 20, 2001. The matter concluded with a judgment on the merits, issued in 2007.
In the meantime, on November 1, 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) (“FRY”) was admitted to membership of the
185
United Nations. Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, but, for many years, FRY
had asserted its status as the successor state, claiming it would “strictly
186
abide by all the commitments that [Yugoslavia] assumed internationally.”
Despite this, and having come to the view that FRY was in fact not the successor to Yugoslavia’s international obligations, in April 2001, FRY filed an
application for revision of the preliminary objections judgment and request187
ed the suspension of the merits proceedings. FRY argued inter alia that
182.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 169–70.
183.
For a detailed account, see Karin Oellers-Frahm, The Principle of Consent to International Jurisdiction - Is It Still Alive: Observations on the Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 2009 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 487.
184.
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevision and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 595, ¶ 47 (June 26).
185.
S.C. Res. 777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
186.
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 1 (Feb. 3).
187.
See Institution of Proceedings, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July
1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), INT’L CT. J. (Apr. 24, 2001),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/122/institution-proceedings. In May 2001 the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) (“FRY”) also submitted to the Court a document titled
“Initiative to the Court to Reconsider ex Officio Jurisdiction over Yugoslavia”, which argued
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because it had not continued the legal personality of the former Yugoslavia,
it was impossible for FRY to have been a party to the Genocide Convention,
and there was no alternative basis for the court’s jurisdiction.
188
The court refused FRY’s request to suspend the merits proceedings.
The revision proceedings were entered in the General List as a new case, as
has been the practice. But this seemingly innocuous administrative detail
now takes on a profound importance because the impugned decision is not a
final judgment on the merits but an interlocutory decision on jurisdiction.
To begin with, the court’s decision in this respect seems to contravene if not
the letter then at least the spirit of what is now article 79bis(4) of the court’s
rules, requiring that when preliminary objections are entered, the proceedings on the merits are (“shall be”) suspended. This article (which has existed
since the 1936 iteration of the PCIJ Rules) promotes the efficient use of the
court and the parties’ resources. It ensures the court does not act on the merits without the authority to do so.
By ignoring this article in respect of FRY’s application for revision, and
indeed by permitting an application for revision of an interlocutory decision
in the first place, the court rendered a potentially absurd outcome whereby it
can hand down a decision on the merits, deciding a matter res judicata, and
yet not have had the legal authority to do so. Moreover, the court failed to
grapple with the fact that the remedy for a judicial act ultra vires is not revision, but annulment. These matters are returned to in Part IV, below.
In 2003, the court rejected FRY’s application for revision as inadmissi189
ble on the rather tenuous and highly contested basis that FRY did not “rely on facts that existed in 1996” but rather on “the legal consequences which
it seeks to draw from facts subsequent to the Judgment which it is asking to
190
have revised.” Ad hoc Judge Dimitrijeviü, in dissent, called it “an attempt
to dispose of the case ‘epistemologically,’ by restrictively interpreting the
191
meaning of the term ‘fact’ as used in Article 61.” Together with the judgthat the Court had no jurisdiction ratione personae over FRY and requesting that the Court
“suspend proceedings regarding the merits of the case.” Rather than suspend the merits, FRY
was granted the opportunity to address the matter of jurisdiction during the oral phase of the
merits proceedings. See “Initiative to the Court to Reconsider Ex Officio Jurisdiction over
Yugoslavia”, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), INT’L CT. J. (May 4, 2001),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/91/other-documents; see also ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 135.
188.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 135.
189.
See Matthew Craven, The Bosnia Case Revisited and the New Yugoslavia, 15
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 323 (2002); Vojin Dimitrijevi & Marko Milanovi , The Strange Story of
the Bosnian Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 65 (2008).
190.
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, pmbl.
191.
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 1 (Feb. 3) (Dimitrijevi , J.,
dissenting).
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ment in El Salvador, the Genocide case decision on revision illustrates the
complexity of defining, as Karnebeek noted in 1899, the scope and limits of
192
what constitutes a “new fact.”
In 2017, Bosnia & Herzegovina applied for revision of the 2007 merits
judgment, but the basis of the application is not on public record. Before the
case was entered in the List, the court determined that the Agent submitting
the application, Mr. Sakib Softiü, had not been validly appointed and, as
193
such, the court had not been properly seized. The application was rejected
194
outright.
This incident highlights in yet another form the essential procedural
195
question of whether revision proceedings should be treated as a new case.
While Mr. Softiü had represented Bosnia & Herzegovina as Agent in the
original proceedings, because the court treated the revision application as a
new and different case, a new appointment as Agent was required. This too
is considered in greater depth in Part IV, below.

B. Revision Simulacra
In addition to the three cases detailed above, the court has also faced
two incidents of revision simulacrum — cases that raise similar issues to re196
vision. The first involved the “examination” of an earlier judgement, and
the second an alleged revision undertaken by the court sua sponte without
197
engaging article 61.

192.
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 750.
193.
International Court of Justice Press Release No. 2017/12, Document Entitled “Application for Revision of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia)” - Statement by H.E. Judge Ronny Abraham, President of
the International Court of Justice (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/pressreleases/0/000-20170309-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf.
194.
Although, as noted by Milanovic: “the Court was perfectly aware that if it allowed
the revision case to proceed now, the case actually had zero prospects for success. When I say
zero, I don’t mean just low or unlikely, but a zero ‘unless a majority of the judges had a seizure’ kind of zero.” Marko Milanovic, The Strangest ICJ Case Got Even Stranger, Or the Revision That Wasn’t, EJIL: TALK! (March 13, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-strangest-icjcase-got-even-stranger-or-the-revision-that-wasnt/.
195.
Geiß & Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1666; see also Dapo Akande, Applications
for Revision of the International Court of Justice’s Judgments: The Curious “Case” for Revision of the Bosnian Genocide Judgment, EJIL: TALK! (March 13, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/applications-for-revision-of-the-international-court-of-justicejudgments-the-curious-case-for-revision-of-the-bosnian-genocide-judgment/.
196.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case Order,
1995 I.C.J. Rep. 288 (Sept. 22).
197.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J.
Rep. 6 (July 18).
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1. New Zealand v. France
In New Zealand v. France, on August 21, 1995, New Zealand filed a
“Request for an Examination of the Situation” — a procedure unknown to
the Statute and Rules. The Request was brought on the basis of the court’s
198
1974 judgments in the Nuclear Tests cases, which stated inter alia, “if the
basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an
examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Stat199
ute.” The original case concerned a claim for the cessation of nuclear testing. France did not appear before the court, but unilateral statements made
by the French authorities undertook that such testing would cease. The court
considered that “the objective of the Applicant has in effect been accomplished, inasmuch as the Court finds that France has undertaken the obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacif200
ic.” As such, the court issued a Judgment that was in effect a nondecision. It held in the dispositif that “the claim of New Zealand no longer
has any object and that the Court is therefore not called upon to give a deci201
sion thereon.”
While France did cease atmospheric nuclear testing, it announced plans
in 1995 for a series of underground nuclear tests at the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. New Zealand’s original case “concerned nuclear contamination
202
of the environment arising from nuclear testing of whatever nature” and
as such, the government of New Zealand considered the situation to warrant
203
a “resumption of the case begun by Application on 9 May 1973.”
In 1995, the use of the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute” in the original Judgment had caused the parties significant consternation. New Zealand was adamant that it was “not seeking an interpretation
of the 1974 Judgment under Article 60 of the Statute, nor a revision of that
204
205
Judgment under Article 61.” Rather, the proceedings were “derivative”;
206
“part of the same case and not of a new one.” By contrast, France argued
that New Zealand’s request was one to “reopen . . . proceedings declared
207
closed by the Court,” and that the action by New Zealand was “more akin

198.
Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 63 (Dec. 20);
Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 60 (Dec. 20).
199.
Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep ¶ 63.
200.
Id. ¶ 55.
201.
Id. ¶ 75.
202.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995
I.C.J. Rep. 288, ¶ 4 (Sept. 22).
203.
Id. ¶ 3.
204.
Id. ¶ 50.
205.
Id. ¶ 48.
206.
Id. ¶ 49.
207.
Id. ¶ 40.
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208

to a request for revision.” An application for revision under article 61 was
manifestly inadmissible as the ten-year time limit had passed long before.
As such, France argued that New Zealand should have brought either an application for interpretation under article 60 or simply filed a new application
209
under article 40(1).
The court’s decision with respect to the procedure of the Request is
sparse. The court held:
in expressly laying down, in paragraph 63 of its Judgment of 20
December 1974, that, in the circumstances set out therein, “the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute,” the Court cannot have intended
to limit the Applicant’s access to legal procedures such as the filing
of a new application (Statute, Art. 40, para. l), a request for interpretation (Statute, Art. 60) or a request for revision (Statute, Art.
61), which would have been open to it in any event;
Whereas by inserting the above-mentioned words in paragraph 63
of its Judgment, the Court did not exclude a special procedure, in
the event that the circumstances in the paragraph were to arise, in
other words, circumstances which “affected” the “basis” of the
210
Judgment.
The court further held that the Request, while a permissible ad hoc procedure, was not made out insofar as the 1974 Judgment “dealt exclusively
211
with atmospheric nuclear tests” and not underground testing. This decision ignores the fact that “New Zealand’s previous application had been
founded on the harm caused to the South Pacific environment by nuclear
212
testing . . .”
Returning to the matter of the procedure, the court was unanimous as to
the validity of the request. The three dissenting Judges concurred on this
213
point. Judge Weeramantry considered the request to be “unusual,” but legitimate, as the court had “used its undoubted powers of regulating its own
214
procedure to devise a procedure sui generis.” Judge Weeramantry further
posited that there was “no merit in the submission that an application under
paragraph 63 is an application for revision under another guise. The two
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. ¶¶ 53–54.
211.
Id. ¶ 63.
212.
Surabhi Ranganathan, Nuclear Weapons and the Court, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 88, 88 (2017).
213.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
320 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
214.
Id. at 320 (Judge ad hoc Palmer stated the same view at 399 and expressed his general agreement with the opinion of Judge Weeramantry at 421).
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procedures are totally different in conception, nature and operation.”
Judge Koroma likewise stated that “paragraph 63 did not anticipate the discovery of new facts but rather provided for an examination of the subject216
matter of the Judgment.”
Putting aside the expiration of the time limit, could the request be conceived as an application for revision? First, it is arguable that there was a
discovery of a new fact — essentially, that underground testing was just as
harmful to the environment as atmospheric testing. This fact was true in
1974 but, due to the limitations in scientific understanding, could not be
known. As observed by New Zealand in its written submissions, if the court
had known this it “could hardly have taken the view that the French renunciation of atmospheric testing could by itself have brought the “dispute” to
217
an end.”
Second, the fact must be a decisive factor. In this respect, there is no
distinction between a fact that may be a decisive factor in a judgment, and a
situation that could arise to “affect the basis of the Judgment,” as Judge
218
Weeramantry posits. However, Judge Weeramantry goes on to draw the
following distinction:
[R]evision involves an alteration or modification of the Judgment,
whereas the Court’s action was aimed at preserving the Judgment
in its full integrity, in the event that some event had occurred which
219
undermined the basis of the Judgment.
I would suggest that “preserving” the Judgment was not the intention of
the court, given that no decision was made. Rather, the court appears to
have been attempting to reserve to itself the option of making a decision in
the future. In this respect, as observed by Judge ad hoc Palmer, it was “an
unusual Judgment of which it might be said that proceedings were not defi220
nitely ended.” Bearing in mind that the 1974 Judgment had not conclusively ruled on whether the court had jurisdiction over the dispute, the intent
behind paragraph 63 appears to have been to preserve the prima facie jurisdiction of the court.

215.
Id. at 321.
216.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
363, 376 (Sept. 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting).
217.
Application, Request for an Examination of Situation, Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.),
(May 9, 1973), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/97/7187.pdf.
218.
Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
321 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
219.
Id. at 320.
220.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
382, 398 (Sept. 22) (Palmer, J., dissenting).
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For this reason, the Request cannot be considered as a revision. There
221
was no decision in 1974, no res judicata in respect of the issues raised in
222
New Zealand’s 1973 Application. As such, there was nothing to revise.
However, the approach taken by the court to the Request is informative.
As noted by Judge ad hoc Palmer, “the formal fact of the status of the
223
case on the Court’s formal list is irrelevant.” Technically, the Nuclear
Tests case was treated as concluded and removed from the List. The Request was entered as a new case in the List. But, as submitted by New Zealand and accepted by the court, the Request proceedings were not a new
224
case. Rather, they were derivative, “part of the same case and not of a new
225
one.” The original case had in fact been resumed. As explained in Part IV
below, there is no reason not to conceive of revision cases in the same manner.
However, to raise a point of distinction, it must be observed that the decision on the Request comes in the form of an order in accordance with arti226
cle 48 of the Statute, rather than a judgment: Revision proceedings are
always dealt with by judgment, as mandated by article 61. This could suggest that revision proceedings are a distinct, new case with a new judgment.
But it is not conclusive; there is no particular reason that proceedings must
end with a judgment rather than an order (domestic lawyers would be familiar with an order for costs following judgment), nor does a separate judgment following a decision on the merits of necessity indicate that the matter
227
under consideration is separate from the original proceedings.

2. South West Africa
Another incident of revision simulacrum arose in the notorious South
West Africa (Second Phase) judgment. In 1960, the court received two sepa221.
See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 62 (Dec. 20). (“It does
not enter into the adjudicatory functions of the Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it
has reached the conclusion that the merits of the case no longer fall to be determined. The object of the claim having disappeared, there is nothing on which to give judgment.”).
222.
Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
377 (Sept. 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting).
223.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
382, 399 (Sept. 22) (Palmer, J., dissenting).
224.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288,
302–03 (Sept. 22).
225.
Id.
226.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 48 (“The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.”).
227.
See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Compensation, 1949 I.C.J. 390, 392 (July
28).
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rate Applications from Ethiopia and Liberia, each instituting proceedings
against South Africa relating to the Mandate for South West Africa. The
Class C Mandate had been created under the auspices of the League of Nations, whereby South Africa, as Mandatory, was permitted to apply South
African law to the territory and treat South West Africa as an integral portion of its own territory. The claim related to the duties and performance of
228
South Africa as Mandatory. The Applications invoked article 7 of the
229
230
Mandate and article 37 of the Statute as the basis of the court’s jurisdic231
tion. The court joined the proceedings, which were then met with preliminary objections from South Africa. South Africa argued that Ethiopia and
232
Liberia lacked standing to bring the case, and the Mandate for South West
233
Africa was no longer in force, despite the court having held in its three
1950s Advisory Opinions that South West Africa was still a mandated terri234
tory. South Africa also asserted there was no dispute between the par235
ties. In 1962, the court rejected all of South Africa’s contentions and held
236
that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute.
In 1966, the Court could have addressed the merits of the case. Instead,
the court returned to two questions of jurisdiction that it considered as hav237
ing an “antecedent character.” First, the court considered whether the
238
Mandate continued to be in force, notwithstanding that in 1962 the court

228.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 321
(Dec. 21).
229.
Mandate for German South-West Africa, League of Nations Doc. C.1920 (1920)
art. 7 (“The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such a dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation,
shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.”).
230.
See Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 37 (“Whenever a treaty or convention in force
provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.”).
231.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Order, 1961 I.C.J. 4, 4–5 (Dec. 5).
232.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 326
(Dec. 21).
233.
Id. at 326–27.
234.
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July
11); Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning Territory of
South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7); Admissibility of Hearings of
Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (June
1). For a general history and overview of the cases, see generally Makane Moïse Mbengue &
Najib Messihi, The South West Africa Cases: 50 Years Later, 1 ETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 11
(2016).
235.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 327
(Dec. 21).
236.
Id. at 347.
237.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 18 (July 18).
238.
Id. at 19.
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239

had held that it did. Second, the court returned to the question of standing.
The court stated that the 1962 Judgment had only addressed the question of
240
Ethiopia and Liberia’s standing “before the Court itself”, and not their
241
“legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim.” The court held
that individual members of the League of Nations were not to be regarded
as having their own legal right or interest in the administration of the Mandate; only the League itself could bring an action concerning the perfor242
mance of the Mandate.
243
The two judgments are clearly inconsistent. For present purposes, the
point of interest is Reisman’s thesis that the second phase of South West Africa constitutes a revision of the 1962 Judgment, notwithstanding that the
244
court did not follow the procedure laid down in article 61. Reisman argues
that the matter of Ethiopia and Liberia’s “legal right or interest” was defini245
246
tively settled in 1962, in favor of the applicants, and was res judicata.
As such, the court was obliged to follow that decision “unless it specifically
resorted to the revision procedure . . . including a judgment expressly re247
cording the existence of a ‘new fact’.” Reisman explains that the court’s
failure to follow the article 61 procedure was “a severe denial of justice”
248
and “an act in excess of jurisdiction”; an excès de pouvoir. Thus, there
249
were “compelling grounds for nullity” of the 1966 decision.
This analysis raises a number of interesting questions, most pertinent of
which is the status of decisions on preliminary objections as res judicata. In
South West Africa, the court opined that it was unnecessary to decide on
“whether a decision on a preliminary objection constitutes a res judicata in
the proper sense of that term, whether it ranks as a “decision” for the purposes of article 59 of the court’s Statute, or as “final” within the meaning of

239.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 347
(Dec. 21) (“The Court concludes that Article 7 of the Mandate is a treaty or convention still in
force within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court and that the dispute is one
which is envisaged in the said Article 7 and cannot be settled by negotiation. Consequently,
the Court is competent to hear the dispute on the merits.”).
240.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962,
I.C.J. Rep. 319 ¶ 347 (Dec. 21) at 347; South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase,
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 18 (July 18).
241.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 19 (July 18).
242.
Id. at 28–29.
243.
Mbengue & Messihi, supra note 234.
244.
William M. Reisman, Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
64–65 (1966).
245.
Id. at 66–68.
246.
Id. at 68–71.
247.
Id. at 71.
248.
Id.
249.
Id. at 83.
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250

article 60.” Judge Jessup, in dissent, forcefully argued there was no distinction between a judgment in respect of jurisdiction and a judgment on the
251
merits in terms of its binding effect. In later years, the court has made
252
clear that it considers decisions on jurisdiction as res judicata. However,
it is one thing to conclude that decisions on preliminary objections are res
judicata. It is a step further to reason that decisions on preliminary objections should be subject to revision. This is returned to in Part IV, below.

3. Ongoing Supervision of Judgments and Related Procedures
There have been other attempts to relitigate issues without resort to the
253
revision procedure. In the Haya de la Torre case, Cuba’s application for
intervention was denied on the basis that it was an attempt to reopen the
254
255
court’s decision in the earlier Asylum case. In Nicaragua v. Colombia,
one of Colombia’s preliminary objections contended that Nicaragua was
256
seeking to appeal the 2012 Territorial and Maritime Dispute judgment.
257
This objection was dismissed without discussion.
There are also cases in which the court continues to exercise a certain
supervisory role in the implementation of its judgments. One example is the
Gabþtkovo-Nagymaros Project, in which the special agreement between
Hungary and Slovakia provides that following Judgment, the parties will
enter into negotiations for its execution, and should there be no agreement
within six months, either party may “request the Court to render an addi258
tional Judgment to determine the modalities of executing its Judgment.”
Slovakia submitted such an application for additional judgment in 1998, but

250.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 59 (July
18).
251.
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 325, 336–37
(July 18) (Jessup, J., dissenting).
252.
Request for Interpretation of Judgment of 11 June 1998 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objection, 1999
I.C.J. 31, 35 (Mar. 25).
253.
Haya de la Torre (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 71, 77 (June 13).
254.
Christine M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before the International Court of
Justice, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 509 (1986).
255.
Question of Delimitation of Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objection, 2016 I.C.J. 100, 110 (Aug. 14); see also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Plurality in
the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach, 28
EUR. J. INT’L L. 13, 65 (2017).
256.
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624
(Nov. 19).
257.
Question of Delimitation of Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objection, 2016 I.C.J. 100, 133 (Aug. 14).
258.
Gabþíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Special Agreement, 1993 I.C.J.
1971, art. 5(3) (July 2).
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negotiations recommenced and the application was eventually discontinued
259
in 2017. The case remains pending at the court, on the basis that the jurisdiction provided for by the special agreement continues and article 5(3)
means that another application for additional judgment could be filed at any
260
time.
The court has also made orders for the ongoing supervision of the im261
plementation of Provisional Measures orders. This is entirely acceptable
as provisional measures are incidental of the main event; their purpose is to
preserve the status quo pending judgment, and the court’s power to continue
supervision thereof will cease once the Judgment is entered. These examples are not analogous to revision.

IV. Proposals for Improving the Revision Procedure
The cases examined above reveal a series of potential problems arising
from the court’s current approach to revision cases: the intervener problem,
as seen in El Salvador v. Honduras; the jurisdiction and related Agent problem, as arising in the second revision application in Genocide; and the interlocutory problem demonstrated by the first Genocide revision application.
One may break these challenges into two essential questions of procedure:
First, whether the court should continue its practice of entering revision proceedings as new cases; and second, whether the court should permit revision
of preliminary objections judgments.

A. A New Case and a New Jurisdiction?
The court has a clear and consistent practice of entering applications for
revision as new contentious cases in the General List, but it is not at all ob262
vious that this practice is necessary or required. Juan Quintana explains
the process:
The formal opening of new proceedings is an operation that occurs
when the case is entered in the General List and is assigned an official name and folio number. This is an internal measure that is taken by the Registrar of the Court, in consultation with the President,
and it is normally performed shortly after a document instituting

259.
Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slok.), 2017-2018 Y.B. (I.C.J.) 8.
260.
Id.
261.
See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Provisional Measure, 2020 I.C.J. 1, 23–24 (Jan. 23); Certain Activities
Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measure, 2011
I.C.J. 6, 28 (Mar. 11); Request for Interpretation of Judgment of 15 June 1962 in Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measure, 2011 I.C.J. 537 (Apr. 28); Application of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor.
v Russ.), Provisional Measure, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 149 (Oct. 15).
262.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 53.
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proceedings is filed. The entering of a new case in the General List
is not disclosed to the public at large as such, and this is why the
name that the case is to bear and the number under which it makes
an entry in the List are only known when the Court issues the first
procedural order in the case, which is normally the order fixing
time-limits for the initial round of written pleadings. The actual entering of the case in the List, however, always precedes the adop263
tion of that order.
Rather than opening a new case, a revision proceeding should be considered as a derivative or incidental proceeding. A derivative or incidental
proceeding is an application which seeks any order other than a final judgment; examples include a decision on provisional measures under article
264
41, or an order in respect of compensation rendered after the decision on
265
the merits. Manley Hudson introduced the expression “incidental jurisdic266
tion” in 1934, using it to describe proceedings for revision and interpretation. Rosenne argues that incidental proceedings take place pendente lite
while the mainline proceedings are in progress, while derivative proceed267
ings take place after the principal judgment on the merits of the case.
There is nothing in the Statute or the Rules which requires the court to open
a separate case in derivative proceedings. Properly conceived, revision proceedings are necessarily derivative, and should not be treated as a new case.
Andreas Zimmermann and Geiß put forward a series of justifications
268
for treating revision applications as new cases. The first reason has to do
with the structure of the court’s Rules — a “systematic” reason. They observe that incidental proceedings are dealt with in Part III, Section D, while
269
revision proceedings are regulated in Section F, subsection 2. This rather
tenuous argument is further supported by their contention that it is “consistent with the practice that judges ad hoc of the original proceedings are

263.
Juan J. Quintana, Procedure Before the ICJ: A Note on the Opening (Or Not) of
New Cases, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 115, 117 (2010); see also ROSENNE, supra
note 28, at 197–208 (for more information on the General List).
264.
See Cameron Miles, The Origins of the Law of Provisional Measures before International Courts and Tribunals, 73 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 615, 671 (2013).
265.
See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Order, 1949 I.C.J. 237 (Nov. 19).
266.
MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A
TREATISE 360 (1934).
267.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 190.,
268.
See Geiß & Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1666; Akande, supra note 195. The
arguments of all three authors are approved by Jessica Joly Hébert. She likewise recommends
that revision be treated as a new case; although suggests that because the links between a revision and its original judgment are “sturdier” than in a situation of interpretation, revision proceedings should be given a new designation as “additional proceedings”. Hébert, supra note
144, at 222–27.
269.
Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666.
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not considered as ipso facto retaining their position in the revision proceed270
ings” and that:
[T]he very nature of revision proceedings supports their qualification as a new case, given that . . . the [s]tate intends to initiate the
reconsideration of a settled case, already removed from the Court’s
271
list of pending cases.
Zimmermann and Geiß, along with Dapo Akande, also point to the
court’s treatment of the Agent for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Sakib Softiü, in the second Genocide revision application, described in Part III.A.3
above. Because the court treated the revision application as a new case, it
could not be submitted by Mr. Softiü without a clear, new, appointment as
272
Agent. However, the court’s treatment of Mr. Softiü is a consequence of
the court’s treating revision applications as new cases; it is not a cause. It
does not explain the court’s approach.
Nor do the other arguments support a claim that revision must be treated as a new case. To take the argument related to judges ad hoc, it is true
that rarely have the same judges opined on both the original case and the revision application. In El Salvador v. Honduras, because the original judgment had been delivered by an ad hoc Chamber, article 100(1) of the Rules
of Court required that request for its revision should be dealt with “by that
Chamber.” Yet, in El Salvador v. Honduras, the ad hoc Chamber no longer
273
existed and “most of its members had passed away,” requiring the constitution of a new Chamber. And in Genocide, neither of the judges ad hoc
were reappointed. But, as with the issue of the Agent, this confuses cause
and consequence. In New Zealand v. France, even though the Request was
274
treated as “part of the same case and not of a new one,” a different judge
ad hoc (Sir Geoffrey Palmer, replacing Sir Garfield Barwick) was appoint275
ed. The court’s practice in this respect did not demand that revision be
treated procedurally as a new case. At best, it was inconclusive.
What then of the argument that revision requires the reopening of a set276
tled case, which will have been removed from the List? Again, New Zealand v. France is instructive. As noted by Judge ad hoc Palmer, in that case,
“the formal fact of the status of the case on the Court’s formal list is irrele-

270.
Id.
271.
Id.; see also Akande, supra note 195.
272.
Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666; Akande, supra note 195.
273.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 141.
274.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995
I.C.J. 288 ¶ 49 (Sept. 22).
275.
Id.
276.
Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666; see also Akande, supra note 195.
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277

vant”. The Nuclear Tests case was treated as concluded and removed from
the List, and the Request was entered separately on the List, but this did not
prevent the court from treating the Request proceedings as derivative and as
278
a continuation of the original case.
Treating applications for revision as new cases also immediately raises
the question of where the court founds the jurisdiction of the new case. The
court did not appear to consider a new consent to jurisdiction necessary. As
observed by Quintana:
[S]ince 1978 the governing criterion for the Registrar as to the
manner in which he treats unilateral acts seeking to institute contentious proceedings should be whether the Application proposes to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent already given or
279
manifested by the State named as Respondent in that document.
The Registrar has never rejected a revision application for want of jurisdiction, nor have parties recited any pleas with respect to jurisdiction in
their applications for revision. On this basis, the revision jurisdiction is either founded on a continuation of the original case jurisdiction, or somewhere else. Consensus appears to favor the latter. Akande points out that despite the revision application being entered as a new case, the jurisdictional
basis is not the same as that for the original case, nor does the court require
the parties’ consent. Rather, it is the parties’ “consent to the Statute itself”
280
that gives the court jurisdiction. Quintana agrees, observing that the juris281
diction of the court to revise its own judgments is “statutory.” He says that
the revision jurisdiction is “bestowed upon the Court by all of the [s]tates
282
that become parties to the Statute.” Rosenne also says that the court’s
treatment of its interpretation jurisdiction, as “a special jurisdiction deriving
283
directly from Article 60 of the Statute,” is analogous and “equally appli284
cable to requests for revision.” Chester Brown goes so far as to claim that
285
the jurisdiction of a court to revise its judgments is inherent.

277.
Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288
¶ 52 (Sept. 22). (Palmer, J., dissenting).
278.
See Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J.
288, ¶¶ 49–54 (Sept. 22).
279.
Quintana, supra note 263, at 123.
280.
Akande, supra note 268.
281.
QUINTANA, supra note 21, at 1029.
282.
Id.
283.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment of 24 February 1982 in
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya) Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 192 ¶ 43 (Dec. 10).
284.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 36 n.26; see also Kazimierz Grzybowski, Interpretation of Decisions of International Tribunals, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 482, 495 (1941) (stating that
the Permanent Court of International Justice [PCIJ] “possesses this jurisdiction as an excep-
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These arguments related to jurisdiction are convincing, even though
they do not directly resolve the Agent problem. However, for present purposes the question is whether revision demands to be treated as a new case.
To the extent that the parties are not required to manifest a new consent to
the court’s jurisdiction, this is evidence that it is not a new case. Indeed, the
key feature of incidental and derivative jurisdiction is that it does not de286
pend upon the consent of the parties but flows directly from the Statute.
As to the Agent problem, the invalidity of the appointment of the Agent
in Genocide needs not be justified on the basis that the revision was a new
case – problems relating to the validity of the appointment of an Agent can
287
arise in any phase. Moreover, the appointment, or not, of an Agent does
not preclude a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction; the two issues are quite
288
separate.
An additional point to note is that if revision were in fact a new case,
one could argue that the admissibility of the application should turn not only
on the existence of a new fact under article 61, but should also require the
existence of a dispute under article 38, and the respondent party’s awareness
tion from the general principles of international law, and it is based upon the express wording
of Article 60 of the Statute.”).
285.
Chester Brown, The Cross-Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and
Remedies in the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 219, 224–25 (2008); see also Brown, supra note 152, at 218. See generally
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 55 (July 13) (suggesting that the PCIJ appeared to indicate that the
power of revision is inherent.). Contra Bowett, supra note 3, at 590 (arguing that it is “doubtful” there is an inherent power of revision.).
286.
HUDSON, supra note 130, at 360; see Cameron Miles, Provisional Measures and
the ‘New’ Plausibility in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. (ADVANCE ARTICLE) 1 (2018) (showing an example where an order for provisional
measures need only establish prima facie jurisdiction).
287.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. v. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 22–24 (July
11). Indeed, the validity of an Agent’s appointment was raised during the merits phase of
Genocide: A Co-Agent purportedly appointed by the Serbian member of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to discontinue the case, while the Chairman for
the Presidency and the agent originally appointed (Mr. Sakib Softi ) did not wish to do so.
The Court eventually held that “Bosnia and Herzegovina had not demonstrated its will to
withdraw the Application in an unequivocal manner” and thus “there had been no discontinuance of the case.” Id.; see also Franklin Berman & Gleider Hernández, Article 42, in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY supra note 21, 967,
969–72.
288.
See Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 42 (the article requires the appointment of an
Agent but makes no provision as to who appoints the Agent). The other articles also do not
make a provision for appointment the Agent. See Statute of the International Court of Justice.
In the Nuclear Tests Case, however, France did not appoint an Agent at all. Request for an
Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, ¶ 29 (Sept. 22); see also
Maritime Delimitation Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Order,
1995 I.C.J. Rep. 423, 424 (Nov. 8); Berman & Hernández, supra note 287, 969–72.
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289

of that dispute. Thus, it does not further support the view that revision
should not be considered a new case.
Dietmar Prager also points out that it is unconvincing to argue that a
new case is required because the Statute requires the filing of an Application. Interventions under article 62 are not dealt with as new cases, even
290
though a request to intervene also requires an Application.
Revision is, rather, a remedy that returns to the point of origin. It reopens the original case, for reasons of individual justice and systemic authority, to ensure that the facts on which the judgment were based are accurate.
291
A revision is an amendment, “without reargument.” The International
Law Commission in 1958 defined the revision procedure as one for “reo292
pening a case upon the ground of the discovery of new facts,” and as not293
ed by Judge Koroma, the court’s task is to “reconsider a matter” in light
294
of the fresh evidence. Judge ad hoc Bastid called it a “modification.”
This leads to the question of what it implies to reopen the merits of a
295
case. Kaikobad argues that “a flawed decision based on incomplete
knowledge with potentially adverse effects cannot create valid legal
296
rights. As such, once new, decisive facts are found to exist, the original
297
judgment may no longer have the force of res judicata. To this end, some
take the view that the court is not bound by any of its reasoning in the prin298
cipal judgment. Dissenting Judge ad hoc Paolillo in El Salvador v. Honduras perceives the second stage of the procedure as being a “fresh exami289.
Juliette McIntyre, Put on Notice: The Role of the Dispute Requirement in Assessing
Jurisdiction and Admissibility Before the International Court, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 546, 548
(2018). Contra Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 60 (requiring the existence of a dispute regarding “the meaning or scope of the judgment.”).
290.
Dietmar W. Prager, Procedural Developments at the International Court of Justice,
1 L. & P. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 189, 214 (2002).
291.
DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 284
(1939), cited in REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 212 n.139, 425.
292.
Commentary on the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifth Session, prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/92, 101 (1955).
293.
Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 7, 24 ¶ 2 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion by Koroma, J.).
294.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 192, ¶¶ 3, 248 (Dec. 10) (separate
opinion by Bastid, J.).
295.
See id.
296.
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 305.
297.
CHENG, supra note 46, at 370.
298.
Geiß, supra note 8, at 184–85; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation
of Judgment of 24 February 1982 in Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J.
192, 247 (Dec. 10) (separate opinion by Bastid, J.) (while observing that the Statute is “silent”
as to the effects of an admissible revision application, queries, “[w]hat would it imply to reopen the merits of a case, and to what extent should the case as a whole be reviewed?”).
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nation of the merits of the dispute . . . A new decision on the merits.” Dissenting Judge ad hoc Dimitrijevi in Genocide posited that opening the proceedings for revision would not have precluded “any possible finding by the
Court that the facts existing at the time of the 1996 Judgment were such that
300
the Court could nevertheless entertain jurisdiction,” including those the
301
court had previously dismissed. In other words, the revision would set
aside the entirety of the original judgment, not merely the part impeached
302
by the new fact. By contrast, Joly Hébert suggests that “both judgments
303
remain, at least partly, applicable.” Judge Vereshchetin considered that
the admissibility of an application for revision did not prejudge “the ulti304
mate result of the revision.” While of decisive importance, the new fact
305
may not ultimately change the outcome. Bowett, however, suggests that
“because revision is dependent on the discovery of new facts, the procedure
does not allow a re-hearing of legal arguments already heard and decided
306
upon.”
The court has not to date answered this question, but regardless of the
extent to which the original judgment is altered, the fact remains that a successful revision will result in “the judgment which ought to have been given
307
in the first place.” As observed by the drafters in The Hague, the judges
308
undertaking revision “complete, so to speak, their former information.”
This strongly indicates that revision is not a new case but, rather, a derivative proceeding. This is not a point of mere semantics, rather a demand for a
clear procedural and conceptual relationship between the revision proceedings and the impeached judgment.

299.
Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 September 1992 in Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 392, 413, 425–26, ¶ 42
(Sept. 11) (Paolillio, J., dissenting).
300.
Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Yugoslavia), Judgment,
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶¶ 53, 68 (Feb. 3) (Dimitrijevi , J., dissenting).
301.
Id. at 69 ¶ 57.
302.
Contra CHENG, supra note 46, at 370 n.23 (writing that “[i]t need hardly be recalled that nullity and a fortiori error may affect only part of a judgment.”).
303.
Hébert, supra note 144, at 226.
304.
Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Yugoslavia), Judgment,
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 39, 50 ¶ 28 (Feb. 3) (Vereshchetin., dissenting).
305.
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 321. Kaikobad explains the complexity of this issue
with respect to boundary lines and suggests that the law of delimitation requires that even
where a new fact of decisive importance is found to exist, the Court must still assess whether
or not to redraw the boundary line, and once it has done so factors additional to the new fact,
such as equitable considerations, will come into play.
306.
Bowett, supra note 43, at 591.
307.
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 306.
308.
SCOTT, supra note 82, at 749.
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There is one final point to be made supporting this position, and, while
it is made in passing, it is of vital importance. It relates to the intervener
problem. According to article 63(2) of the court’s Statute, a State intervening in proceedings concerned with the interpretation of a multilateral treaty
is bound, just as the original parties are, by the court’s interpretation. But
the court’s present approach of treating revision as a new case means that if
the intervening State does not apply to appear in the revision proceedings, it
will be bound by a decision that is no longer correct. This absurdity (along
with the inefficiencies of re-intervening under article 62 identified in section
III.A.2, above) could be easily avoided if the court treated revision as derivative, rather than as a new case.

B. Revision of Preliminary Objections – A Return to Finality
The procedural flaws in the court’s habit of treating revision proceedings as new cases become even more apparent when one considers that the
court has also permitted revision of judgments on preliminary objections. A
separate case does not make sense if the principal proceedings are still pend309
ing. One may make a strong argument for why the court should amend its
Rules to prevent applications for revision in respect of preliminary objec310
tions.
To begin with, it is entirely probable that a decision on the merits will
be rendered prior to the expiry of the ten-year time limit mandated by article
311
61. Were the court to revise a decision on preliminary objections, the
flow-on effect for the merits judgment would not be clear at all. In Geno312
cide, the court did not suspend proceedings on the merits, suggesting the
possibility of rendering a decision on the merits that turns out to have been
issued ultra vires. By treating the revision as a new case, rather than as a derivative proceeding, the procedural relationship becomes even further removed.
It may be that one could simply say the merits decision is automatically
voided. But this is not necessarily the case; for example, if a jurisdictional
claim based on the treaty is revised, what happens to claims based upon cus-

309.
Prager, supra note 290, at 214.
310.
Contra Kunz, supra note 52, at 8. In the context of arbitration, Kunz asserts but
does not justify that revision is available as a remedy for preliminary decisions. Kunz goes on
to suggest that revision cannot be sought against procedural orders or orders for interim relief
which a tribunal can reverse or modify. This approach would unnecessarily reopen the can of
worms in the South West Africa Case. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary
Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21).
311.
The International Law Association reports that as of 2018, the average length of
proceedings, from application to judgment, was 103-104 months (excluding extensions, joinder of proceedings, and provisional measures. ARMAN SARVARIAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, PROCEDURES OF INTERNAITONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, INTERIM REPORT
(2018).
312.
See supra Part III.A.3.
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tomary law or another treaty? This relates directly to the issue discussed
above–how much of the impugned original judgment is to stand? It is entirely possible that the merits judgment, or parts thereof, could remain in force
by taking an alternative jurisdictional route. Nothing in the Statute, Rules, or
the court’s current practice offers an answer to this problem.
More fundamentally, revision of preliminary objections judgments
should not be permitted because it will conflate revision on the basis of fait
nouveau with annulment for excès de pouvoir. As detailed in Part II, above,
when the contours of the revision procedure were agreed at The Hague, a
clear distinction was drawn between revision and the possibility of annulment. Whether or not an arbitral award could be annulled was left unre314
solved. Some judges on the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920 declared that it was “inadmissible” that the Permanent Court of International
315
Justice should be able to annul its own decisions. In subsequent years, this
has been overlooked.
The precise contours of excès de pouvoir are open to debate, but, without question, it encompasses decisions made in excess of the jurisdictional
316
competence of the tribunal. It embodies the maxim extra compromissum
arbiter nihil facere potest–a maxim deriving from Roman civil law meaning
that because the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is voluntary, they cannot act outside
317
the authorization granted by the parties. The court has grappled with this
concept in its case law. In Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, the parties had been
unable to reach a settlement in respect of maritime delimitation. They had
submitted their dispute to an arbitral tribunal, the decision of which was
rendered in 1989. Guinea-Bissau subsequently brought an action to the
court, alleging the award rendered by the tribunal was null and void on the
318
grounds of excès de pouvoir and insufficiency of reasoning. In concluding
that the award was not void, the court defined excès de pouvoir as an act “in

313.
See Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, 448 ¶ 63 (July 20). The Court did “not find it necessary” to consider its jurisdiction under Statute, art. 36(2), because it had founded jurisdiction on the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 6(2), 7(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
314.
SCOTT, supra note 82, at 151.
315.
League of Nations, Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the
League of Nations Under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the Assembly of the
Statute of the Permanent Court, at 103, League of Nations (1921).
316.
R. Erich, Projet de Conférer à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale des
Fonctions d’une Instance de Recours, 3(ser. 12) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION
COMPAREE 268 (1931).
317.
AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 35 (2009).
318.
See Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J.
Rep. 53, 59 (Nov. 12).
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manifest breach of the competence conferred” on the tribunal. Judge Ni
described it as a situation in which a tribunal “has exceeded or overstepped
320
the powers which have been attributed to it by the Parties.”
As such, where any tribunal allegedly lacks jurisdiction, the appropriate
claim is one of nullity for excès de pouvoir, not an application for revision
of the decision. Annulment is concerned with the legitimacy of the pro321
322
cess, not the substantive correctness of the decision, which is the realm
of revision. Moreover, and in any event, allegations of excès de pouvoir
323
cannot be raised until after the conclusion of the hearing on the merits. Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, because until the merits have been
decided, it cannot be known with certainty whether the decision-makers
have overstepped the bounds of their authority. It must be recalled that
when the revision procedure was drafted, there was no procedure for separating preliminary objections from the merits–this was not included until the
324
1926 iteration of the PCIJ Rules. In 1875, the Institut de droit international declared there was to be no appeal from any preliminary judgments
325
on the question of a tribunal’s competency. The intersection of revision
and preliminary objections was not given any consideration.
Decisions on preliminary objections were not considered res judicata
until relatively recently. As noted in Part III.B.2, above, the court held in
South-West Africa that it was unnecessary to decide on “whether a decision
on a preliminary objection constitutes a res judicata in the proper sense of
that term, whether it ranks as a ‘decision’ for the purposes of article 59 of
326
the court’s Statute, or as ‘final’ within the meaning of article 60.”
It was not until the 1978 iteration of the Rules that decisions on preliminary objections were required to be rendered in the form of a judgment.

319.
Id. at 69.
320.
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J.
Rep. 53, 96, 101 (Ni, J. dissenting).
321.
See David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID FOREIGN INV. L.J. 21,
26 (1992).
322.
See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Half Way Down
the Slippery Slope, 10 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 211, 212 (2011).
323.
See, e.g., Verdoss, supra note 116, at 242 (quoted as saying, “Ce n’est que lorsque
la sentence finale est rendue que la cause de nullité pour excès de pouvoir peut être invoquée
éventuellement,” which translates to, “It is only when the final award is made that the cause of
nullity for excess of power can possibly be invoked.”).
324.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
325.
See Projet de règlement pour la procedure arbitrale internationale, 1877
ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L 130 (“Aucune voie de recours ne sera ouverte contre
des jugements préliminaires sur la compétence, si ce n’est cumulativement avec le recours
contre le jugement arbitral définitif.” [“No appeal will be opened against preliminary judgments on jurisdiction, except cumulatively with appeal against the final arbitral judgment.”]).
326.
South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966
I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 37 (July 18).
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Subsequently, the court has emphasized that there is no “distinction between
judgments on jurisdiction and judgments on the merits when it comes to the
327
application of the res judicata principle.” In the interpretation proceedings
328
in Cameroon-Nigeria, the court stated:
By virtue of the second sentence of article 60, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain requests for interpretation of any judgment rendered by it. This provision makes no distinction as to the type of
judgment concerned. It follows, therefore, that a judgment on preliminary objections, just as well as a judgment on the merits, can be
329
the object of a request for interpretation.
Rosenne suggests that this judgment settles the “doctrinal controversy
330
whether a judgment on preliminary objections constitutes res judicata,”
which in turn opens decisions on jurisdiction to being “subjected to the pro331
cedures of interpretation and presumably revision.” That decisions on preliminary objections could be the subject of revision is also alluded to in the
332
dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup in South-West Africa, and, of course,
the court in Genocide did not question Bosnia and Herzegovina’s applica333
tion on such a basis. However, it is one thing to conclude that decisions on
preliminary objections are res judicata. It is a step further to argue that decisions on preliminary objections should be subject to revision. To permit this

327.
Mbengue & Messihi, supra note 234, at 28; see also Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, 90 (Feb. 26).
328.
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 1999. I.C.J. Rep.
31, 35 (March 25).
329.
Id.
330.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 111.
331.
Id. at 109. Cf. Benjamin Salas Kantor & María Elisa Zavala Achurra, The Principle
of Res Judicata Before the International Court of Justice: In the Midst of Comradeship and
Divorce Between International Tribunals, 10 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 288, 294 (2019)
(“the extent to which a decision on jurisdiction is binding for the Court in the merits phase is
still controversial”).
332.
See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 325, 332
(July 18) (Jessup, J., dissenting); see also South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase,
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 239, 240 (Koretsky, J. dissenting).
333.
However, by hearing arguments as to jurisdiction raised by the Initiative during the
oral phase of the merits, proceedings in Bosn/Herz. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J. Rep. at 90, the Court
muddied the waters somewhat. The distinguishing factor, one could argue, is that while a decision on preliminary objections is res judicata, to the extent that it does not address every
preliminary issue, other arguments could be raised at a later date. This was the interpretation
of Article 79bis(1) of the Rules of Court (“other objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits”) contented for by FRY/Serbia’s counsel. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. V. Serb.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 4.29 (Mar. 9, 2006, 10:00 AM),
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/91/091-20060309-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf..
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is to blur the line between revision and nullity and to take the procedure further than it was ever intended to go.
So, if decisions on preliminary jurisdiction should not be subject to revision, can one ensure justice is done between the parties? Theinel and
Zimmermann take an uncompromising approach, suggesting “a judgment
upholding jurisdiction with the force of res judicata in fact establishes such
334
jurisdiction as a matter of law.” On this basis, the Court effectively cannot
act excès de pouvoir. The possibility of revising the decision on the merits,
of course, remains.
Alternatively, Verdoss considers that if an excès de pouvoir is established, part of the judgment or award rendered without authority is void, ip335
so jure. But this arguably runs the risk of a party unilaterally declaring the
judgment void in order to avoid compliance, which has potentially disas336
trous consequences for the court’s perceived legitimacy, along with the
337
stability of legal relations.
Cheng suggests an invalid decision could be reconsidered by another
338
tribunal if both parties agree to submit the question to arbitration. However, this raises the question of the authority of that tribunal to judge the acts
of the court, and certainly calls into question the perception of the court as
sitting at the apex of the system’s fragmented international courts and tribu339
nals.
Instead, as Thomas Franck has observed, the court’s capacity to “pull”
states towards compliance with its decisions rests on the legitimacy and
340
fairness of its opinion-forming process. This returns to the heart of the
matter and brings to light the relationship between procedural justice and
341
“essential justice—a correct decision on the merits of the case.” Put simply, revision has an important but not omnipresent role to play. On balance,
finality should trump justice in respect of decisions on jurisdiction.

334.
Theinel & Zimmermann, supra note 67, at 1633.
335.
See Verdoss, supra note 116, at 241.
336.
See Franck, supra note 19, at 40.
337.
See REISMAN, supra note 21, at 45.
338.
See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 46, at 371.
339.
See Jonathon I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 71 (1998); Andrew Lang, The Role of the International Court
of Justice in a Context of Fragmentation, 62 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 777, 779 (2013); Neil B.
Nucup, Infallible or Final?: Revisiting the Legitimacy of the International Court of Justice as
the “Invisible” International Supreme Court, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 145, 146
(2019).
340.
See Franck, supra note 19, at 31.
341.
H.W.A. Thirlway, Procedural Law and the International Court of Justice, in FIFTY
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT
JENNINGS 389, 400 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
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As such, the court’s compétence de la compétence should not be open
342
to revision. In an extreme case, such as fraud, the proper remedy is not
343
revision, but annulment. This leads to one difficulty faced by the delegates at The Hague in 1899: Who judges the judges? Their inability to answer this question led to the matter of annulment being left out of the drafting task altogether. This problem is no greater than that faced by courts of
344
last resort in domestic systems. A court has inherent power to set aside a
judgment which it has delivered without jurisdiction. As noted by the English Court of Appeal, so far as procedure is concerned “the court in its inherent jurisdiction can set aside its own order, and. . . it is not necessary to
345
appeal from it.” It is a matter ex debito justiciae, and there should be no
requirement to meet the stringent conditions of article 61. Rather, the court
346
should adopt a procedure, sui generis, should the need ever arise.

V. Conclusion
This account of the revision procedure suggests that it continues to be in
need of some refinement. The procedure has been neglected, if not at times
entirely disregarded. The procedural problems that arise in the court’s practice are avoidable errors, requiring two minor changes: first, the court
should no longer treat revision applications as new cases. There is nothing
in the Statute or the Rules which requires this approach, and, as seen above,
it leads to several unnecessary complications. Second, the court should no
longer accept applications for revision of preliminary objections and should
make this clear in its Rules. The only solution for a claim of incorrectly
seized jurisdiction is to annul the decision. Revision is not the appropriate
remedy. These proposals do not advocate for increased formalism but, rather, for increased clarity and a greater thoughtfulness. The domestic antecedents and drafting history of revision emphasize the role of revision as a
347
means of doing substantial justice between the parties, and it remains an

342.
See CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 185 (2009).
343.
See, e.g., id. at 189; see also CHENG, supra note 46, at 358.
344.
See generally Craig v. Kanssen [1943] KB 256 (Eng.); Forfie v. Seifah [1958] AC
59 (PC) (appeal taken from WACA); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 112–121.
For example, a court has the inherent power to set aside an order made against a person who
did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their case. Taylor v Taylor [1979]
143 CLR 1, 1 (Austl.).
345.
Craig v. Kanssen [1943] KB at 262.
346.
The power to do so would arise under Statute, art. 30, as it did in Request for an
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Orders, 1995, I.C.J. Rep. 288, at ¶ 288
(Sept. 22).
347.
SCOTT, supra note 82; LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra
note 127, at 215.
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important remedy for the court. With some adjustment, revision can continue to serve its essential, if limited, function.

